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Secrecy for the Sake of It:
The Defend Trade Secrets Act
A DEVOLVING GLOBAL MARKET BASED ON THE
LEGAL PROTECTION OF OVER-SECRECY
“Even when there is risk involved in keeping a secret, we
believe there is greater risk in its disclosure.”1
INTRODUCTION
At a time when bipartisanship on Capitol Hill may feel
as if it is an unattainable fantasy, both sides of the aisle agree
nearly unanimously on at least one subject: we must steadfastly
defend our trade secrets.2 This once-limited realm of intellectual
property litigation has exploded in recent decades and has touched
nearly every industry,3 from automakers to military technology
innovators, healthcare researchers to food manufacturers, and
entertainment conglomerates to fashion magnates.4 Trade
secrets, however, are distinct from other forms of intellectual
property, as the term typically pertains to information that is

1 Gina Roberts-Grey, Keeping Secrets Can Be Hazardous To Your Health,
FORBES (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2013/10/24/keepingsecrets-can-be-hazardous-to-your-health/#2bc8f0737efc [https://perma.cc/K5YB-SSXP]
(statement of Peter Zafirides, a psychiatrist of Columbus, Ohio).
2 Sebastian Kaplan & Patrick Premo, The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016
Creates Federal Jurisdiction for Trade Secret Litigation, IPWATCHDOG (May 23, 2016),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/23/defend-trade-secrets-act-2016-creates-federaljurisdiction-trade-secret-litigation [https://perma.cc/CE3R-FYJN].
3 See William E. Hammel, William J. McMahon, and Anna Rothschild, The
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016: A New Federal Claim for Misappropriation, CONSTANGY
(May 12, 2016), http://www.constangy.com/communications-632.html [https://perma.cc/
7ACX-YHX3]; see also David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret
Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 301–02, 309–10 (2010).
4 BRIAN T. YEH, CONG RESEARCH SERV., R43714, PROTECTION OF TRADE
SECRETS: OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
secrecy/R43714.pdf [https://perma.cc/78H9-WDEG] (“Well-known examples of trade
secrets include the formula for Coca-Cola, the recipe for Kentucky Fried Chicken, and
the algorithm used by Google’s search engine.”); see also Latest Updates on Federal Trade
Secrets Legislation, SEYFARTH SHAW, http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/latest-update-onfederal-trade-secret-legislation [https://perma.cc/X4SE-2C5L].
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not publicly available as a result of the holder taking pains to
keep such information a mystery to the rest of the world.5
Lawmakers and government agencies, including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), have taken notice of and
expounded upon the importance of trade secret protection in our
ever-growing and continually-shifting global markets.6 Indeed, a
report released by the Obama Administration lists several cases
of espionage that have been investigated since 2009,7 including
conspiracies to steal trade secrets related to hybrid technology
from General Motors and a multiple-year operation to steal
trade secrets related to DuPont’s Kevlar vests by “exporting
sensitive U.S. military technology to China.”8 To stay apace with
and outperform foreign nations, especially in areas of
technology, over the past four decades forty-eight states have
adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).9 The UTSA
provides a standardized legal structure for claims arising out of
alleged misappropriation of trade secrets and outlines
appropriate avenues of relief.10
5 See What Is a Trade Secret?, W ORLD I NTELL . P ROP . O RG ., http://
www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/trade_secrets.htm [https://perma.cc/
EVH4-7H65] (“Broadly speaking, any confidential business information which provides an
enterprise a competitive edge may be considered a trade secret.”); see also Glenn R. Schieck,
Note, Undercutting Employee Mobility: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in the Trade
Secret Context, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 831, 834 (2014) (“In particular, trade secret law strikes
an important balance between protecting valuable company information on the one hand,
and promoting the mobility of knowledge-based workers on the other hand.”).
6 See Chinese National Pleads Guilty to Stealing Ford Trade Secrets, FBI
(Nov. 17, 2010), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/detroit/press-releases/2010/de11171
0.htm [https://perma.cc/KJQ6-E2P8] [hereinafter Chinese National]; Former CME
Group Software Engineer Pleads Guilty to Stealing Globex Computer Trade Secrets
While Planning to Improve Electronic Trading in China, FBI (Sept. 19, 2012), https://
archives.fbi.gov/archives/chicago/press-releases/2012/former-cme-group-software-eng
ineer-pleads-guilty-to-stealing-globex-computer-trade-secrets-while-planning-to-impr
ove-electronic-trading-in-china [https://perma.cc/BR5H-DWGH]; Top Executives at
Kolon Industries Indicted for Stealing DuPont’s Kevlar Trade Secrets, FBI (Oct. 18,
2012), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/richmond/press-releases/2012/top-executives-atkolon-industries-indicted-for-stealing-duponts-kevlar-trade-secrets [https://perma.cc/N
2BR-TABU] [hereinafter Top Executives]; Two Convicted in Conspiracy to Steal GM
Trade Secrets Sentenced to Prison, FBI (Apr. 30, 2013), https://archives.fbi.gov/
archives/detroit/press-releases/2013/two-convicted-in-conspiracy-to-steal-gm-trade-se
crets-sentenced-to-prison [https://perma.cc/PR9E-EY3P] [hereinafter Two Convicted].
7 See discussion infra Section I.B.
8 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON
MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 2
(2013),
https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mitiga
ting_the_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UD8-CUDU]; see supra note 6
and accompanying text.
9 Bradley E. Chambers, Texas Joins 47 Other States to Adopt the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, BAKER DONELSON (May 20, 2013), https://www.bakerdonelson.com/
texas-joins-47-other-states-to-adopt-the-uniform-trade-secrets-act-05-30-2013 [https://
perma.cc/D5JQ-DEHF] (adoption by Texas in 2013 brought the state’s law “into line with
the 47 other states that have adopted the uniform act.”). See discussion infra Section I.A.
10 Latest Updates on Federal Trade Secrets Legislation, supra note 4.

2017]

SECRECY FOR THE SAKE OF IT

361

The fatal flaw of the UTSA, however, is that it only
governs state law claims.11 If there is no basis for diversity of
citizenship between the parties or a plaintiff cannot claim any
violations of federal law, filing in often over-burdened state
courts tends to lead to extended and delayed litigation.12 Delays
likely cause further exposure of the trade secrets at issue, which
can defeat the purpose of pursuing misappropriation claims in
the first place.13 Small leaks and minor frustrations by
disgruntled or dishonest employees14 can ultimately morph into
huge liabilities equaling millions in loss,15 not only in economic
terms, but lost time in the race to be first, and even loss of life.16
In the face of global terrorism and constant national
security concerns, legislators faced increasing pressure to offer
more vigorous protection for trade secrets under federal law.17
Consequently, congressional leaders in both parties began to
push for trade secrets legislation at the federal level.18 President
Barack Obama voiced his support early in the process,19 and on
May 11, 2016, signed the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) into
law.20 For the first time, there exists a statutory mechanism—
the DTSA—to provide a basis for original federal jurisdiction for
private civil actions alleging trade secret misappropriation.21
See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 7–8.
Mark L. Krotoski & Greta L. Burkholder, Time to Modernize and Strengthen
Trade Secret Law, MORGAN LEWIS (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/
time-to-modernize-and-strengthen-trade-secret-law [https://perma.cc/XH7A-ZW83]; see
also Almeling et al., supra note 3, at 296.
13 Krotoski & Burkholder, supra note 12.
14 Almeling et al., supra note 3, at 294 (A study of over 394 trade secrets cases
revealed that “[i]n over 85% of trade secret cases, the alleged misappropriator was
someone the trade secret owner knew—either an employee or a business partner.”).
15 Krotoski & Burkholder, supra note 12.
16 “The illicit transfer of technology with military applications to a hostile state
such as Iran or North Korea could endanger the lives of US and allied military personnel.”
OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
FOREIGN SPIES STEALING U.S. ECONOMIC SECRET IN CYBERSPACE 3 (Oct. 2011), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mitigating_
the_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9YG-6MNZ].
17 See discussion infra Part I.
18 S. Rep. No. 114-220, 114th Cong., 2d Sess., Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016
9-10 (2016) [hereinafter Senate Judiciary Report]. The DTSA was enacted by Congress
on April 27, 2016. Latest Updates on Federal Trade Secrets Legislation, supra note 4.
19 Gene Quinn, Obama Administration strongly supports Defend Trade Secrets
Act, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/04/04/obamaadministration-supports-defend-trade-secrets-act [https://perma.cc/UY4A-HXUK] (In
early April 2016, “the White House released a Statement of Administration Policy, which
strongly supports passage of s. 1890, the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA).”).
20 See Trade Secret Legislation, INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, https://www.ipo.org/
index.php/advocacy/hot-topics/trade-secret-legislation [https://perma.cc/ES6L-77XL].
21 MARK L. KROTOSKI & GRETA L. BURKHOLDER, THE LANDMARK DEFEND
TRADE SECRETS ACT OF 2016 7 (2016), https://www.morganlewis.com/~/media/files/
publication/morgan%20lewis%20title/white%20paper/the-landmark-defend-trade11

12
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Importantly, in an attempt to resolve grievances related to
litigation delays under the UTSA, the DTSA directs that,
“[b]ased on an affidavit or verified complaint . . . the court may,
upon ex parte application but only in extraordinary
circumstances, issue an order providing for the seizure of
property necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination
of the trade secret that is the subject of the action.”22 This clause
is the DTSA’s formidable ex parte seizure provision.
Such an unprecedented provision in trade secrets law
must be broken down in order to fully grasp its significance.
Most notably, the provision allows for a plaintiff to ask the court
for relief ex parte.23 Contrary to the nature of our adversarial
system, notice to opposing parties is not required in an ex parte
proceeding.24 If a court rules in favor of an ex parte seizure
application, an order will be issued to have the government,
through and by its law enforcement officers (i.e., U.S.
Marshals),25 seize and hold the property of the unknowing
opposing party until a preliminary hearing is set on the matter.26
The statute is groundbreaking because federal jurisdiction for
trade secrets claims has been proposed and failed several times
before.27 But the DTSA also opens a mysterious back door to an
already teeming underworld of secrecy and cronyism. Will
containing industry secrets under the DTSA protect society from
harm, or does it signal the end of collaborative innovation and
the codification of secrecy as the way the game has to be played?
Is there a middle ground that protects both the value of secrets
and knowledge sharing?

secrets-act-of-2016-may2016.ashx?la=en [https://perma.cc/KFJ2-NVMT] (a detailed law
firm paper offering suggestions for clients on how to interpret and work within the DTSA).
22 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–153, § 2(b)(2)(A)(i), 130
Stat. 376, 376 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 2016)).
23 Id. (permitting a complaining party to file an “ex parte application”).
24 An ex parte proceeding is “of, relating to, or involving court action taken or
received by one party without notice to the other,” and is usually “for temporary or
emergency relief.” Ex parte, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
25 Eric Goldman, The DTSA’s Ex Parte Seizure Order: The “Ex” Stands for
“Extraordinary,” TECH. AND MARKETING L. BLOG (Feb. 1, 2017), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2017/02/the-dtsas-ex-parte-seizure-order-the-ex-stands-for-extraordinary-guest-b
log-post.htm [https://perma.cc/V2Y9-U7ZA] (where the author explains that if an ex parte
seizure order is granted it “means federal marshals could show up at an offender’s doors to
confiscate computers or servers without the defendant even being heard”).
26 See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 2016).
27 Eric Goldman, Congress Is Considering A New Federal Trade Secret Law.
Why?, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2014, 12:14 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/
2014/09/16/congress-is-considering-a-new-federal-trade-secret-law-why/#7f03e59b43e8
[https://perma.cc/QP2Q-3G9X] (“For several years, bills have been introduced into
Congress to fill this perceived gap. Those bills have gone nowhere, but they have helped
coalesce a growing coalition of supporters for a new federal law.”).
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While allowing trade secret misappropriation to stand on
its own as a federal cause of action is a huge step forward in this
area of law,28 this note argues that Congress overstepped the
Constitution by including an ex parte seizure provision in the
trade secrets context. The legislative history shows that the
statute was drafted with the economic and security interests of
the nation in mind, but the DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision
will likely not accomplish its lofty goals. The statute instead
legally permits large corporations with sizeable resources to
silence less financially robust competitors, mostly in the form of
ex-employees.29 Thus, both on its face and as applied, the DTSA’s
ex parte seizure provision violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution.30 Trade
secrets constitute a fragile form of intellectual property, but
should be considered a property-interest,31 and the seizure of
such property must be afforded due process of law. Due process
is essential to the foundation of our democracy and is key to
understanding how future trade secrets litigation will fairly
commence and proceed.32
Part I of this note discusses the background of the DTSA,
including an overview of actionable trade secrets claims, a
Krotoski & Burkholder, supra note 12.
“Trade secret owners were twice as likely to prevail on a motion for
preliminary relief when they sued employees as when they sued business partners.”
Almeling et al., supra note 3, at 294. See, e.g., Universal Prot. Servs. v. Thornburg, No.
2:16-CV-0097-J, 2016 WL 4523905 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2016) (where a security company
sued two former employees under the DTSA); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rote, No. 3:16-CV-01432HZ, 2016 WL 4191015 (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2016) (where an insurance company sued a former
employee under the DTSA); Panera, LLC v. Nettles, No. 4:16-CV-1181-JAR, 2016 WL
4124114 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016) (where a corporation that operates “bakery-cafes” sued a
former employee under the DTSA); GTO Access Sys., LLC v. Ghost Controls, LLC, No.
4:16CV355-WS/CAS, 2016 WL 4059706 (N.D. Fla. June 20, 2016) (where a company that
makes automated entry gates sued two former employees under the DTSA). Compare
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1078–80 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (granting a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) “prohibiting [the] [d]efendant from accessing or using
[the plaintiff ’ s ] information and from contacting or soliciting [the plaintiff ’ s ] customers,”
but denying an ex parte application for mirrors of all the data the defendants’ personal
devices), with Free Country Ltd. v. Drennen, 235 F. Supp. 3d 559, 563, 568 n.11 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (distinguishing Schein when a plaintiff moved ex parte for an order to show cause for
a preliminary injunction and TRO); Complaint, Magic Leap, Inc. v. Bradski, No. 5:16-cv02852 (N.D. Cal. filed May 26, 2016) [hereinafter Magic Leap Complaint] (where a virtual
reality company sued two former employees under the DTSA).
30 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any State deprive any person
of . . . property, without due process of law”).
31 See James A. Johnson, Keeping Your Secrets Secret, 87 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J.
24 (July/Aug. 2015).
32 See David R. Fertig and Michael A. Betts, The Defend Trade Secrets Act:
Jurisdictional Considerations–Part II, 29 No. 8 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 12 (Aug.
2017) (“After all, due process of law, as guaranteed by the Constitution, requires that a
federal court possess both subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy and personal
jurisdiction over each and every defendant before it may proceed to consider the merits
of the plaintiff ’ s claim.”) (emphasis in original).
28
29

364

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1

discussion of the evolution of trade secrets law, and a review of
notable cases that led to the DTSA’s inclusion of an unprecedented
ex parte seizure provision in trade secrets law. Part II examines
the DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision, including an in-depth
comparison of ex parte seizures for other forms of intellectual
property, Congress’s rationale for including the provision, and
the reasons that this provision is problematic through the lens
of recent cases decided under the statute. Part III argues that
the DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision needlessly tramples due
process in the trade secrets context and investigates the
practical implications of the provision in terms of its effects on
business and human relations as well as its considerable
exposure to constitutional challenges. Finally, Part IV offers
solutions and alternative approaches to the ex parte seizure
provision, principally to narrow the definition of “extraordinary
circumstances” so that parties will at least be afforded
constructive notice when they are involved in circumstances that
may fall within the potent provision’s purview.
I.

CALLS FOR FEDERALLY ACTIONABLE CLAIMS: THE PATH
TO THE DTSA

The term “trade secrets” must be unpacked, in order to
understand the property-like interests the DTSA seeks to
protect.33 Although many have tried to pin it down into a
digestible definition,34 the full meaning of the term remains
rather elusive. Simply demonstrating intent to have information
be kept confidential is generally insufficient to legally render
such information a legitimate and protectable trade secret.35 The
UTSA, the closest law that the DTSA has as a predecessor,
provides an instructive and succinct definition of the fraught
concept, characterizing a trade secret as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to,
and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.36

33 See Michelle L. Evans, J.D., Establishing Liability for Misappropriation of
Trade Secrets, in 91 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 95 § 2 (2017) [hereinafter Establishing
Liability].
34 See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
35 Establishing Liability, supra note 33, at § 2.
36 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4).
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More plainly, courts generally deem information to be a protectable
trade secret when the plaintiff has (1) “derived independent
economic value from the information;” and (2) made reasonable
efforts to keep the information in question confidential.37
The second consideration, demonstrating reasonable
secrecy measures, is often more easily satisfied (e.g., using
computer passwords, confidentiality agreements, etc.).38 The
first prong, as it pertains to the protectability of the information,
is where plaintiffs, and even courts, often get it wrong. In terms
of deriving independent economic value, while a “secret
combination, compilation, or integration of [well-known]
individual components” may add up to a protectable trade secret,
courts will not hold matters of common knowledge or easily
retrievable information as protectable because it is likely that
many others conceivably could, or are already, profiting from the
information.39 In most instances, courts determine that “plans,
designs, negative information, computer software, customer lists,
non-public financial information, cost and pricing information,
manufacturing information, confidential information about
business opportunities, and certain personnel information”
constitutes information from which competitive financial value
can be derived.40 In short, the plaintiff, in seeking protection,
must demonstrate that the information is unquestioningly and
independently unique so as to provide an advantageous
economic edge in the marketplace.
Not only do trade secret complainants have a high burden
of proof to meet, but in many states, whether the information is
protectable is a question of fact for a jury to determine, while in
others it is a mixed question of fact and law.41 Obscurity in the
underlying concept and vast differences in interpretation across
the states as to what actually constitutes trade secrets made this
emerging area of law all the more mystifying and frustrating
Establishing Liability, supra note 33, at § 2.
Courts have found that common tactics such as “using and enforcing
computer passwords, releasing information on a ‘need to know’ basis, confidentiality
agreements, or verbal instructions for confidentiality” generally demonstrate reasonable
efforts of information protection. Id.; see, e.g., RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859,
862 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (where an employee signed a non-disclosure agreement); Liberty
American Ins. Group, Inc. v. WestPoint Underwriters, L.L.C., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1303
(M.D. Fla. 2001) (where the trade secrets were deemed protected by confidentiality
agreements); AmeriGas Propane, L.P. v. T-Bo Propane, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 685, 694 (S.D.
Ga. 1997) (holding a covenant of confidentiality “void and unenforceable”); Curtis 1000,
Inc. v. Suess, 843 F. Supp. 441, 444 (C.D. Ill. 1994) (where the court examined a
confidentiality provision within general terms of an employment contract), aff’d, 24 F.3d
941 (7th Cir. 1994).
39 Establishing Liability, supra note 33, at § 2.
40 Latest Updates on Federal Trade Secrets Legislation, supra note 4.
41 Establishing Liability, supra note 33, at § 2.
37
38
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over the years.42 In recent decades, many intellectual property
attorneys and scholars called for reformed trade secret legislation.43
These calls for reform were especially loud with regard to trade
secret claims being actionable at the federal level.44
A.

State Adoption of UTSA and the Call for the DTSA

Since its enactment in 1979, forty-eight states adopted
either complete or altered versions of the UTSA.45 As the vast
majority of states have more or less operated under some form
of the UTSA for the last forty years,46 it is important to
understand its pleading standards. To state a civil claim for
trade secret misappropriation under the UTSA, a plaintiff must
allege that a defendant “wrongfully obtained or disclosed trade
secrets of plaintiff.”47 In other words, inappropriate acquisition,
wrongful disclosure, or both, are claims upon which a plaintiff
may seek relief. Depending on each state’s interpretation of its
adopted provisions of the UTSA, disclosure is typically more fact
specific than the standard for wrongful acquisition and may be
42 See generally Krotoski & Burkholder, supra note 12, at 1–2 (where the
authors expound upon ways in which trade secrets law could be modernized).
43 See Letter from Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n, to Senate Judiciary Comm.
in Support of S. 1890, the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (Nov. 30, 2015), http://
www.ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/20151124-DTSA-Support-Senate-Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YY9N-U3ZU]; IPO Letter from Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n,
Supporting Protection for Trade Secrets in H.R. 3534 (July 29, 2010), https://
www.ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/IPO_Letter_Trade_Secret_Protection_in_HR_
3534.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7MC-8P7F]; see also David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to
Enact A Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769,
770 (2009).
44 See Almeling et al., supra note 43, at 770.
45 See generally Joseph D. Mornin, What You Need to Know About the Defend
Trade Secrets Act, 28 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 20 (Sept. 2016) (a brief article
summarizing the DTSA). New York and Massachusetts are the only two states that have
not adopted any provisions of the statute and still govern misappropriation of trade
secrets claims entirely at common law. Chambers, supra note 9; see also Almeling et al.,
supra note 3, at 306–07.
46 Almeling et al., supra note 3, at 306–07.
47 Establishing Liability, supra note 33, at § 6 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs
alleging wrongful acquisition have a relatively low bar to meet. Id. Courts generally hold
that inappropriate acquisition has occurred when information flows from or through a
person by way of improper means and it was obtained “under circumstances giving rise
to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; . . . or derived it from or through a person
who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use.” Id.
The alleged discloser, whether an individual or corporation,

must have: (1) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the
trade secret; (2) known or had reason to know that the information
was a trade secret and the information had been acquired by accident
or mistake; or (3) known or had reason to know at the time of
disclosure or use that his knowledge of the trade secret was acquired
inappropriately.
Id.
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more difficult to adequately plead.48 The DTSA was born, in part,
to assist with assuaging uncertainty over varying state
application of the UTSA. If a plaintiff and defendant reside in
different states, for example, the plaintiff may run into a choice of
law issue and will lack confidence about which state law the court
will decide to apply under the forum’s conflicts of law analysis.49
Thus, new trade secrets legislation, some argued, was required to
combat this uncertainty as well as other disadvantages, such as
wasted time in overcrowded state courts.50
Other forms of intellectual property have longstanding
original federal jurisdiction. Congress used its power under the
commerce clause to enact laws like the Lanham Act, which
includes “a federal private right of action . . . for unfair
competition in misappropriation of commercial identity” for
trademarks, as well as “for misappropriation of unpublished
works” under the Copyright Act.51 Yet no similar statute creating
a federal cause of action to address unfair competition vis-à-vis
trade secret misappropriation was able to get through Congress.
This disconnect at the federal level is perhaps because trade
secrets claims often “involve[ ] many more legal issues than are
raised by copying a trademark,” or a copyrighted work and are
mostly brought with claims that are exclusively governed by
state law, such as breaching confidentiality (i.e., contract) or
breaching a fiduciary relationship (i.e., tort).52 Furthermore,
examination of state law reveals vast differences in the
definition of a trade secret itself. Such differences include items
specifically barred from trade secret classification and which
precautions actually constitute “reasonable secrecy measures.”53
A handful of states require that the information must be novel
in order to constitute a trade secret while others are quite

48 When the alleged misappropriation is a result of a wrongful disclosure a
heightened standard in the form of a knowledge requirement kicks in. See id.
49 Alissa Cardillo, Note, Another Bite at the Apple for Trade Secret Protection:
Why Stronger Federal Laws Are Needed to Protect a Corporation’s Most Valuable
Property, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 577, 601 (2016).
50 Krotoski & Burkholder, supra note 12 (When in state court, “[f]or example,
obtaining a deposition of a witness in another state can require multiple court orders in
different jurisdictions and lengthy delays.”).
51 Stephen Y. Chow, Essay, DTSA: A Federal Tort of Unfair Competition in
Aerial Reconnaissance, Broken Deals, and Employment, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE
341, 346 (2016).
52 Id. at 346–47. See Eric Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade
Secrets Act, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 284, 306 (2015) (“Trade secrets differ from
registration-based IPs because the putative owner must establish ownership during the
registration process.”).
53 Latest Updates on Federal Trade Secrets Legislation, supra note 4. (For
example, “Idaho expressly includes computer programs” as classifiable trade secrets.).
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protective of wrongfully shared, but decidedly non-original and
arguably publicly retrievable, customer databases.54
Federal courts also have exclusive jurisdiction over
patent actions, a handy loophole that has resulted in an
onslaught of plaintiffs combining trade secrets claims with
patent claims to avoid state court.55 The filing of trade secret
suits in federal court under the guise of combination patent
claims doubled three times since 1988.56 In contrast, trade
secrets litigation in state court “has not doubled in the past
fifteen years and is not projected to double for at least the next
twenty years.”57 Thus, while state courts may be overworked in
general, the evidence shows that federal trade secrets claims
have been steadily increasing with state courts claims
stagnating over recent decades.
The vast array of inconsistencies embedded within
application of state trade secrets law, only some of which are
mentioned above,58 led legal scholars and intellectual property
law practitioners to argue that making trade secret claims
originally actionable at the federal level would help clear up this
muddied area of law.
B.

Notable Cases and Settlements Related to DTSA’s
Enactment

Proponents of the DTSA also argue that economic
espionage for the benefit of foreign nations is a major threat to
our national security.59 In 2012, the FBI put up billboards in nine
cities across the United States displaying the message: “$13
Billion Lost—Protect America’s Trade Secrets.”60 During this
Id.
Cardillo, supra note 49, at 580–81; see Almeling et al., supra note 3, at 293.
56 Combination claims “doubl[ed] from 1988 to 1995, double[d] again from 1995
to 2004, and is projected to double a third time by the year 2017.” Cardillo, supra note
49, at 581; see Almeling et al., supra note 3, at 293.
57 Id. at 581; see Almeling, et al., supra note 3, at 293–94.
58 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
59 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON
MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 1 (2013), https://obamawhite
house.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mitigating_the_theft_of
_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3S8-43ZH] [hereinafter Obama Report]. See id. at
acknowledgement page (noting that the compilation is a comprehensive report resulting from
“a collaborative effort and reflects the recommendations and input from various entities of the
U.S. government”).
60 Economic Espionage. How to Spot A Possible Insider Threat, FBI (May 11,
2012), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/how-to-spot-a-possible-insider-threat [https://
perma.cc/5L4M-YF5T] (“[T]he cost of economic espionage to the U.S. can currently be
seen on digital billboards.”). The FBI also “released a short film based upon an actual
case, The Company Man: Protecting America’s Secrets, aimed at educating anyone with
a trade secret about the threat and how they can help mitigate it.” Latest Updates on
54
55
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same year, the Director of the National Security Agency
suggested that recent instances of “cyber espionage” constitute
“the greatest transfer of wealth in history.”61 Computer security
companies, such as “McAfee[,] estimate[ ] [that] global
remediation costs a[re] $1 trillion per year” as a result of economic
espionage efforts to obtain confidential trade secret information.62
In addition to these staggering statistics, in the years
immediately preceding the DTSA, three alarming cases were
frequently cited as proof that a massive upgrade in trade secrets
protection was not only warranted, but also desperately needed
to protect the interests of the United States.63 Prosecuted in the
criminal context, these FBI investigations ultimately resulted in
plea bargains and substantial damage awards.64 The harmed
entities in these cases are among the United States’ corporate
giants, including Ford Motor Company (Ford) in 2010, DuPont
in 2012, and General Motors in 2013.65 Although these three
trade secrets cases are extreme examples, the government
heavily publicized the economic interests at stake and
highlighted the foreign actors involved, effectively allowing
proponents to more easily pass the DTSA with the ex parte
seizure provision included.66
In the Ford case, the FBI reported that, while employed
by Ford, a Chinese national living in the United States copied
thousands of company documents onto a hard drive, resigned his
post, and transferred documents containing trade secrets to one
of Ford’s direct competitors, “the Beijing Automotive
Company.”67 The trade secrets consisted of “specifications for
engines and electric power supply systems estimated to be worth
between $50 million and $100 million.”68 Next, in the DuPont
Federal Trade Secrets Legislation, supra note 4. Interestingly, the FBI-sponsored “film
illustrates how one U.S. company was targeted by foreign actors and how that company
worked with the FBI to address the problem.” Id. (emphasis added).
61 Josh Rogin, NSA Chief: Cybercrime constitutes the “greatest transfer of
wealth in history,” FOREIGN POLICY (July 9, 2012), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/09/
nsa-chief-cybercrime-constitutes-the-greatest-transfer-of-wealth-in-history
[https://
perma.cc/P93H-J43K].
62 R. MARK HALLIGAN, PROTECTING U.S. TRADE SECRET ASSETS IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 4 (Sept. 2013), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
landslide/2013_september_october/protecting_us_trade_secret_assets_in_the_21st_cent
ury.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/F942-ETWC] (where the author argues that,
“[n]ot a day goes by without another report of foreign economic espionage, computer
attacks, and trade secret theft”).
63 Latest Updates on Federal Trade Secrets Legislation, supra note 4.
64 See discussion infra notes 67–69.
65 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
66 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
67 See Chinese National, supra note 6.
68 Latest Updates on Federal Trade Secrets Legislation, supra note 4.

370

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1

case, the FBI found that a DuPont employee had engaged in a
conspiracy to misappropriate trade secrets involving Kevlar, a
complex synthetic fiber.69 Kolon, DuPont’s competitor, pled guilty
to the indictment, and was “sentenced to pay $85 million in
penalties and $275 million in restitution.”70 Finally, in the
General Motors case, the FBI alleged that a former employee and
her spouse wrongfully acquired company trade secrets “related to
hybrid vehicle technology worth $40 million” with intent to
disclose the information to Chery Automobile, a Chinese
competitor.71 These three cases explicitly show that the economic
stakes in losing these types of trade secrets are tremendously
high, especially when dealing with foreign nations.
One could ostensibly operate under the assumption that
these cases are representative of the majority of trade secret
misappropriations to come (i.e., that most trade secrets cases are
espionage-type acts perpetrated by foreign actors for the benefit
of foreign interests to the detriment of the United States). In
other words, these highly publicized cases are a shining
illustration of the exact type of occurrences that many members
of Congress may have had in mind when voting in favor of the
DTSA. It remains to be seen, however, whether these cases are
actually representative of most trade secret actions brought in
the United States or whether these are the outliers.72 These
cases, thoroughly investigated by the FBI, are likely the most
extreme form of trade secrets cases. Each case easily served as
a shiny primer for fear-mongering tactics to paint all trade
secrets cases in a dark and ominous hue and ensured that the
legislation was speedily and nearly unanimously passed.
The Ford, DuPont, and General Motors cases, along with
more recent reports of wrongdoing,73 led to a renewed call to
See Top Executives, supra note 6.
Latest Updates on Federal Trade Secrets Legislation, supra note 4. Five of
the corporation’s executives and employees were also indicted in the conspiracy. See Top
Executives, supra note 6.
71 Latest Updates on Federal Trade Secrets Legislation, supra note 4. See Two
Convicted, supra note 6.
72 For example, “virtually all trade secret disputes involve former employees”
and many are not against foreign nationals. See Charles Tait Graves, Trade Secrets as
Property: Theory and Consequences, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 43 (2007).
73 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Glendale Man Who Stole and
Distributed Trade Secrets Belonging to Former Employer Sentenced to One Year in
Federal Prison Taking Flight Man Sentenced for Distributing Avionics Trade Secrets (June
6, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/glendale-man-who-stole-and-distributedtrade-secrets-belonging-former-employer [https://perma.cc/YY3V-TQJF] (where an exemployee of an aircraft electronics company was found guilty of trade secret
misappropriation in violation of the EEA in 2014); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Just., Former PPG Employee Charged with Theft of Trade Secrets (May 8, 2015), https://
www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/pittsburgh/news/press-releases/former-ppg-employee69
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action to create the DTSA to protect against foreign actors.74
After all, the DTSA was enacted as an amendment to the 1996
Economic Espionage Act (EEA).75 Until the DTSA, criminal law
enforcement invoked the EEA to bring actions by the
government against lawbreakers in the interest of the people,
and the statute did not provide for a private right of civil action
to protect the interests of a corporation, for example.76 State
officials often justify seizure of competitor assets under the EEA
with the idea that “[t]heft, whether hands-on or through cyber
intrusions, diminishes our competitive edge in technology and
product development and deprives our citizens of economic
opportunities.”77 Pointing to the ability for U.S. companies to
effectively compete in the global marketplace appears to be an
all too repetitive chorus for those in favor of harsher and more
stringent trade secret protection.
Staying in this protectionism vein in the lead up to the
enactment of the DTSA, the FBI and the Obama Administration
released several reports about trade secrets theft.78 The external
pressures pushing the United States toward more enforcement
of trade secrets laws is evident throughout this 2013 report:
Emerging trends indicate that the pace of economic espionage and
trade secret theft against U.S. corporations is accelerating. There
appears to be multiple vectors of attack for persons and governments
charged-with-theft-of-trade-secrets [https://perma.cc/4L82-2F8M] (where an ex-employee
was arrested for delivering proprietary information to a Chinese company “that
specializes in automotive and other specialty glass”).
74 See Jessica L. Sblendorio, The Defend Trade Secrets Act: A Remedy, HAUG
PARTNERS (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.haugpartners.com/article/the-defend-trade-secretsact-a-remedy [https://perma.cc/QP3P-KPXE] (“With the developing landscape of
cybersecurity and globalization, an increased demand exists from both companies and
consumers for further trade secret protections.”); see also Scott McDonald & Jackie
Johnson, Trade Secrets Finally Get Federal Law Protection, LITTLER (May 2, 2016),
https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/trade-secrets-finally-get-federal-law-prote
ction [https://perma.cc/9QZY-5X8W] (“A significant part of the congressional focus on trade
secret laws that gave birth to the DTSA was concern over international economic
espionage.”).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Former PPG Employee Charged with Theft of Trade Secrets, supra note 73
(statement of U.S. Attorney David J. Hickton).
78 See, e.g., Obama Report, supra note 59. The opening quote by President
Obama in his Administration Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets report
gives the most succinct rationale behind passing such a law: “We cannot look back years
from now and wonder why we did nothing in the face of real threats to our security and our
economy.” Obama Report, supra note 59, at 1; Victoria Espinel, Launch of the
Administration’s Strategy to Mitigate the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets, WHITEHOUSE.GOV
(Feb. 20, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/02/20/launch-administ
ration-s-strategy-mitigate-theft-us-trade-secrets [https://perma.cc/7934-5YKM] (“In order
to continue to lead, succeed, and prosper in the 21st Century global economy, we will use
this Strategy to put in place an effective and coordinated approach to protect American
trade secrets.”).
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seeking to steal trade secrets. Foreign competitors of U.S. corporations,
some with ties to foreign governments, have increased their efforts to
steal trade secret information through the recruitment of current or
former employees. Additionally, there are indications that U.S.
companies, law firms, academia, and financial institutions are
experiencing cyber intrusion activity against electronic repositories
containing trade secret information. Trade secret theft threatens
American businesses, undermines national security, and places the
security of the U.S. economy in jeopardy. These acts also diminish U.S.
export prospects around the globe and put American jobs at risk.79

The report goes further to stress that the U.S.
government and its trading partners must treat trade secret
theft as a “serious issue” and states that federal agencies will
now be engaged in promoting best practices to private corporate
entities while simultaneously strengthening the enforcement of
trade secrets laws.80 After reading the Obama Administration’s
frank assessment of the risks our country faces, it is no wonder
that lawmakers clamored to react by passing a law that would
attempt to make the citizenry safer.81
A few years before the Obama Administration released its
report, in 2010, the U.S. Attorney General created a Task Force on
Intellectual Property within the FBI to investigate primarily
“domestic offenses under the Economic Espionage Act, [which]
increased the number of trade secret theft investigations by 29
percent” over the past three years.82 The Department of Justice
reports that the “FBI will continue its outreach and education
efforts with the private sector through various local, regional and
national initiatives.”83 Here, the government has decidedly taken a
hand in protecting private corporate interests using the judicial
branch, law enforcement, and public funds, all in the name of
national security. This revelation is rather perplexing because in
reality “the data call[s] into question the extensive and expensive

79 See Obama Report, supra note 59, at 1 (footnotes omitted); see also Remarks
by the President at Signing of S. 1890—Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. (May 11, 2016, 3:43 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2016/05/11/remarks-president-signing-s-1890-defend-trade-secrets-act-2016
[https://perma.cc/RL88-QE6B] (At the signing of the DTSA, President Obama remarked
that, “all too often, some of our competitors, instead of competing with us fairly, are
trying to steal these trade secrets from American companies. And that means a loss of
American jobs, a loss of American markets, a loss of American leadership.”).
80 See Obama Report, supra note 59, at 3, 6.
81 “On July 29, 2015, with bipartisan support, Congressional leaders in both
the House and Senate, including Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Christopher Coons (DDE) and Representative Doug Collins (R-GA), introduced bills to create a federal private
right of action for the misappropriation of trade secrets.” Latest Updates on Federal
Trade Secrets Legislation, supra note 4.
82 Obama Report, supra note 59, at 7.
83 Id. at 9.
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efforts to stop espionage from unrelated third parties.”84 The
unopposed passage of the DTSA and the inclusion of its
unprecedented ex parte seizure provision highlights that national
security risks may induce even the most courageous individuals to
recoil. When widespread panic sets in, the underlying fear of
risking erroneous and unnecessary deprivations of our most basic
constitutional rights unfortunately appear to melt away.85
C.

Legislative History of the DTSA

Trepidation about national security shaped the DTSA. As
news of the DTSA’s passage spread, law firms specializing in
intellectual property practice described the federal statute as
“the most significant trade secret reform legislation in several
decades.”86 The most prominent difference between the UTSA
and the DTSA is the ability to file misappropriation claims as a
federal cause of action under the jurisdictional element of the
DTSA.87 Additionally, related causes of action under the same
common nucleus of operative facts are not preempted by
bringing a misappropriation claim, as they generally are under
the UTSA.88 The jurisdictional element, however, is most
certainly not the most troubling aspect of the new law. The
reasons that Congress became compelled to draft the ex parte
seizure provision must be examined to more fully comprehend
the true purpose of this legislation.89
Almeling et al., supra note 3, at 303.
See, e.g., David S. Levine, School Boy’s Tricks: Reasonable Cybersecurity and
the Panic of Law Creation, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 323, 323–24, 331 (2015)
(explaining that the DuPont case “sheds light on the panic that has taken hold around
cyberespionage and policymaking, a panic reflected in the DTSA”). Similarly, lawmakers
and scholars have argued that widespread fear after September 11, 2001, led to the
enactment of the Patriot Act, which has been criticized for disregarding the reasonable
right to privacy guaranteed in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Peter
Baker, In Debate Over Patriot Act, Lawmakers Weigh Risks vs. Liberty, N.Y. TIMES (June
1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/us/politics/in-debate-over-patriot-act-law
makers-weigh-risks-vs-liberty.html [https://perma.cc/AS3K-J32F] (reporting that “[j]ust
one senator voted against the Patriot Act, calling it a violation of civil liberties,”
demonstrating a “shift [that] underscores an evolution in thinking about the risks and
trade-offs of terrorism”).
86 KROTOSKI & BURKHOLDER, supra note 21, at 3. Until the DTSA’s enactment,
misappropriation of trade secrets civil actions were entirely governed by state law. See
Mornin, supra note 45, at 20. The DTSA maintains a similar definition of
misappropriation as the UTSA, allowing for comparable remedies “including injunctive
relief, compensatory damages, and exemplary damages and the recovery of attorneys’
fees in the event of willful or malicious misappropriation.” Latest Updates on Federal
Trade Secrets Legislation, supra note 4.
87 Latest Updates on Federal Trade Secrets Legislation, supra note 4.
88 Id.
89 To reiterate, in relevant part, the ex parte seizure provision in the DTSA
states that, “[b]ased on an affidavit or verified complaint . . . the court may, upon ex parte
application but only in extraordinary circumstances, issue an order providing for the
84

85

374

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1

It is widely understood and accepted that once a trade
secret is shared, it is no longer legally protectable.90 While
similar to the UTSA, the DTSA’s definition of a trade secret allows
for a broader interpretation of the term.91 The most notable
difference in the statutory text is that the UTSA requires that the
measures taken to protect the information were “reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy” and the DTSA
only mentions “reasonable measures” but fails to mention “under
the circumstances.”92 This widens the purview of the statute to
make nearly any “information” protectable rather than specific
and particular information subject to a set of narrow
circumstances and conditions.93 The omission indicates that
legislators intended to significantly expand a plaintiff’s ability
to plead misappropriation under federal law.94
The idea of using protective or injunctive orders in the
name of equity developed early in this area of law. The first
known trade secrets case—surrounding “[a] secret formula for

seizure of property necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of the trade
secret that is the subject of the action.” 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 2016)
(emphasis added).
90 See Levine, supra note 85, at 340 (“[T]rade secrets cease to exist once they
are publicly disclosed . . . .”); Johnson, supra note 31 (“A trade secret must be just that:
secret.”).
91 Krotoski & Burkholder, supra note 12. The court in M.C. Dean, Inc. v. City
of Miami Beach explains the DTSA’s definition,
Under the DTSA, a trade secret is information for which: (A) the owner thereof
has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and (B) the
information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper
means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure
or use of the information.
M.C. Dean, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, Fla., 199 F. Supp. 3d 1349, 1353 (S.D. Fla. Aug.
8, 2016) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)).
92 Compare UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (where a trade secret must be
“the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy”) (emphasis added), with 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (“the owner thereof has taken
reasonable measures to keep such information secret”) (emphasis added).
93 Compare UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (where the UTSA identifies
eight specific types of trade secret information, such as a “formula, pattern compilation,
program device, method, technique, or process”), with 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (where the
DTSA significantly expands the definition of trade secrets to include “all forms and types
of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information,
including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes,
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically,
electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing”); see also Peter J. Toren, Five
Things to Know About the Defend Trade Secrets Act, IPWATCHDOG (May 11, 2016), http://
www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/11/five-things-know-defend-trade-secrets-act [https://per
ma.cc/U8CD-YAX2].
94 “In short, almost every type of information can qualify as a trade secret . . . .”
Toren, supra note 93.
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treating gout”95—arose in England in 1817.96 The first trade
secrets case occurred in the United States two decades later
when a Massachusetts court ordered specific performance of a
contract governing the limited and private use of “a secret
method for making chocolate.”97 Consequently, many state
courts interpreted trade secrets as “a property-like interest”
using injunctive relief as a common remedy to put a stop to its
illegal disclosure or use.98 The history of parties using these
types of injunctions and protective orders in related fields of
intellectual property law,99 and other determinative factors,100
more or less gave Congress the green light to include the ex parte
seizure provision in the DTSA, the first of its kind in the trade
secrets context.101
Upon examination of the events leading up to the
legislation, it is apparent that Congress invoked national
security concerns as a basis for the DTSA, yet the law is
primarily benefiting large corporations that have no discernable
hand in such interests. Thus, as many parties that may not have
previously maintained proper justification to seek such swift and
unchecked relief now have federally sanctioned statutory
authority to ask for it, this underlying motive of the law makes
it especially more problematic that the ex parte seizure provision
was included. Moreover, it was drafted in such a broad capacity
as to signify the potential for gross misuse.

95 Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101
VA. L. REV. 317, 324 n.31 (2015) (quoting Newbery v. James, 35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (Ch.)
1011–12 (1817)).
96 Id. at 324.
97 Id. (citing Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523, 525–27 (1837)).
98 Id. Despite this long-held interpretation in most state courts, numerous
scholars outright refute that a trade secrets holder possesses actual property, yet most
agree that preventing the disclosure of such information is worth substantial efforts in
the interest of public policy and the national economy. See Chow, supra note 51, at 347–
50, 355 (“Instead of preventing unfair competition by targeting unauthorized use of
specific information, employers use the less expensive, blunt instrument of prohibiting
post-employment competition altogether . . . .”); see also Johnson, supra note 31 (noting
that “we need to develop a uniform standard of protecting trade secrets” because “[w]e
live in the information age and trade secret law is specifically intended to protect
information”).
99 See discussion infra Section II.A.1.
100 Such as threats to national security. See, e.g., Obama Report, supra note 59,
at 3 (“The theft of U.S. trade secrets by foreign competitors or foreign governments has
been and will continue to be raised by the most senior levels of the Administration with
countries of concern.”).
101 See Peter J. Toren, Handle with Care: Civil Seizure Under the Defend Trade
Secrets Act, IPWATCHDOG (July 5, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/07/05/handlecare-civil-seizure-defend-trade-secrets-act [https://perma.cc/A5ZC-GXH3].
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II.

EX PARTE SEIZURE IS PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS IN THE
TRADE SECRETS CONTEXT

A.

Interpretation of the Ex Parte Seizure Provision

The DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision allows for a
complaining party to petition the court to have the government
confiscate and hold intellectual property by issuing a seizure
order with no notice to the opposing party.102 Critically, the
provision does not permit a hearing on the merits before
property is seized.103 On its face, the DTSA appears to be
unconstitutional, and denies citizens the right to due process.104
Prior to the DTSA, “[t]he only existing seizure remedy in
intellectual property law is found at 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) of the
Lanham Act, which applies to counterfeit marks.”105 As there is
“no comparable [ex parte seizure] provision in any state law”
related to trade secrets,106 the question then becomes, does the
government have a compelling enough interest to override
vitally important and fundamental constitutional considerations
to specifically protect trade secrets?
1. Ex Parte Orders Differ in Trademark and Copyright
Cases
This is not the first instance that Congress has passed a
law allowing the federal judiciary to issue orders in ex parte

18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(1) (Supp. 2016).
Katherine A. Kelter, Major Revisions to Federal Trade Secrets Law Now in
Effect—Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 Signed by President Obama, MASS. EMP. & BUS.
LITIG. RESOURCE (May 17, 2016), http://www.massemploymentbizlit.com/2016/05/majorrevisions-to-federal-trade-secrets-law-now-in-effect-defend-trade-secrets-act-of-2016signed-by-president-obama [https://perma.cc/DW9E-W7E8].
104 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 326, 333, 349 (1976) (where the
U. S. Supreme Court found that the government’s seizure of property in civil cases with
no opportunity to be heard is unconstitutional). To be clear, circumstances exist where
the state does maintain a compelling interest in certain types of ex parte protective
orders, for example, in instances of domestic violence or stalking. See, e.g., Peter Finn,
Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection Orders Against
Domestic Abuse, 23 FAM. L. Q. 43, 43 (1989) (“Temporary orders may be obtained in an
ex parte proceeding in order to provide for a victim’s immediate safety when there is
insufficient time to give notice to the batterer. Soon after the respondent receives notice,
the court holds a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be heard.”). The
compelling justification for an ex parte proceeding in such a situation is rooted in
safeguarding the immediate physical safety of the complainant and thus, substantially
outweighs the risk of erroneous deprivation of the non-present defendant’s due process
rights. See id. at 43–44.
105 Toren, supra note 101 (internal quotations omitted). See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1116(d)(4)(B)(i), (vii) (2012).
106 Toren, supra note 93.
102

103
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proceedings, even in the sphere of intellectual property.107 The
most analogous example is that trademark owners are able to
request comparable seizure orders specifically to protect
“counterfeit use of their registered marks.”108 Trade secrets,
however, differ markedly from other forms of intellectual
property. The owner of copyrighted material must register that
work with the U.S. Copyright Office before it can be actionable
for an infringement claim as federally protected intellectual
property.109 Similarly, a court will not even entertain the idea of
granting an ex parte seizure order if allegedly counterfeit goods
do not contain a registered trademark.110 When considering a
work for registration, a trademark or copyright examiner is
tasked with evaluating the “eligibility for protection”111 in terms
of the subject matter of the material, in addition to other
considerations.112 This process leads to the conclusion that any
ex parte seizure order request pertaining to registered
trademarks or copyrighted works “provides the judge with wellinformed and independent guidance about protectability.”113
This type of guidance is independent because the complaining
party is not the one opining about the reliability of its federally
registered material’s protectability.
In the trade secrets context, there is no such process and
the protectability of trade secrets is largely left to judicial
discretion, often in areas where judges may have limited
technical knowledge. Even in cases where the works or marks
have been duly registered and vetted by administrative officials,
courts are often disinclined to grant ex parte relief in the
trademarks context and usually only entertain such applications
if a preliminary injunction hearing would not sufficiently
address the plaintiff’s claims.114 Eric Goldman115 found that
trade secrets “work[ ] differently than copyright and trademarks
in ways that affect the legitimacy of ex parte seizures,” making

See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
Adam W. Poff, Changes on the Horizon for Trade Secret Misappropriation,
33 DEL. LAW. 24, 27 (2015).
109 Goldman, supra note 52, at 305.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 See Poff, supra note 108, at 27.
115 “Eric Goldman . . . is on a list of 20 Most-Cited Intellectual Property &
Cyberlaw Faculty from 2010–2014 on Brian Leiter’s Law School Reports.” Michelle
Waters, Eric Goldman is one of 20 Most-Cited Intellectual Property & Cyberlaw Faculty,
SANTA CLARA UNIV. SCH. L. (June 28, 2016), http://law.scu.edu/news/eric-goldman-is-oneof-20-most-cited-intellectual-property-cyberlaw-faculty [https://perma.cc/G8UX-LYD9].
107
108
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it “so imitating their seizure provisions does not make sense.”116
These differences are significant and should not be overlooked.
First, as it has been established that registered
trademarks, patents, and copyrighted works undergo an extensive
review process, the public is deemed to have constructive notice
that they may be infringing on an individual or entity’s property
rights.117 When used to protect federal rights in a trademark, for
example, the Lanham Act’s “seizure provision[ ] appl[ies] to
chattel manufactured for sale that was designed to infringe,”118
and thus a seizure, although not wholly anticipated, is an
equitable remedy for such knowingly wrongful use. There is no
such notice in the trade secrets context and others may arrive at
an idea independently not knowing it is a protected trade
secret.119 Even though it may not be actual notice, being put on
constructive notice in trademark and copyright actions
effectively outweighs the risk of erroneous deprivation and
allows requests for ex parte seizures to proceed in a
constitutionally permissible fashion.120
Second, judges are forced to examine “the existence of a
trade secret as a matter of first impression, without any
guidance from an independent government examiner.”121 This
leads to the unfortunate possibility that a court may erroneously
render its decision about the protectability of a trade secret. A
distinct possibility exists that “a non-specialist judge . . . will
make more mistakes” in trade secrets cases “than [in] ex parte
Goldman, supra note 52, at 306–07.
William M. Borchard, When Should and Should Not Be Used, COWAN,
LIEBOWITZ & LATMAN (May 1, 2001), http://www.cll.com/newsroom-publications-When__
Should_and_Should_Not_Be_Used [https://perma.cc/FY6M-EE9W] (“Under the law,
everyone is deemed to have constructive notice of federal . . . registrations.”).
118 Goldman, supra note 52, at 306-07; see 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (2012).
119 Goldman, supra note 52, at 306-07.
120 For an examination of notice in the trademark context, see Champions Golf
Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1123 (6th Cir. 1996) (“After
registration, there can be no new ‘innocent’ users, and even an innocent prior user cannot
expand the area of its use, because Lanham Act registration puts all would-be users of
the mark (or a confusingly similar mark) on constructive notice of the mark.” (emphasis
added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1072; Thrifty Rent–A–Car Sys., Inc. v. Thrift Cars, Inc., 831
F.2d 1177, 1181 (1st Cir. 1987)). Additionally, one case before the U.S. Customs and
Patent Appeals Court originally established registration as akin to constructive notice
in the patent law context. Willson v. Graphol Products Co., 188 F.2d 498, 505 (1951) (“It
is our opinion that appellants’ registration constituted constructive notice to
appellee . . . .” (emphasis added)). As for copyright law’s treatment of notice, courts have
found that a “copyright registration certificate in the Copyright Office provides
‘constructive notice as to the ownership of the copyright and the facts stated in the
registration certificate.’” Latin Am. Music Co., Inc. v. The Archdiocese Of San Juan of
Roman Catholic & Apostolic Church, 499 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2007) (emphasis added)
(quoting Saenger Org., Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Licensing Assocs., Inc., 119 F.3d 55, 67
(1st Cir. 1997)).
121 Goldman, supra note 52, at 305; see Levine, supra note 85, at 327–28.
116

117
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proceedings based on registered copyrights and trademarks.”122
While it is enticing to apply seemingly objective reasoning that
trade secrets law should also provide for ex parte seizures simply
because federal trademark and copyright statutes allow for it,
this line of thinking is risky because it puts unknowing parties
at risk for unjust consequences.123
2. Congress’s Rationale
The DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision is generally
characterized as “an extremely powerful remedy.”124 Congress
grounds its rationale for the provision’s inclusion in “the
possibility of destruction of evidence or its removal from the
country” if the alleged misappropriators learn of impending legal
action against them.125 It would appear that the underlying
rationale is really that drastic times, call for drastic measures.
The sheer number of safeguards put firmly into place within the
statutory text126 permits the inference that Congress understood
that including a provision that allows ex parte action comes with

Goldman, supra note 52, at 305; see Levine, supra note 85, at 327–28.
See Goldman, supra note 52, at 306–07. “Trade secret cases routinely involve
factual disputes that will not be appropriate for ex parte resolution and will increase the
potential for erroneous seizures, even when trade secret owners are careful and wellmeaning.” Id. at 287; see also Levine, supra note 85, at 327–28.
124 See Toren, supra note 93.
125 McDonald & Johnson, supra note 74.
126 See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 2016) (These safeguards are built
directly into the statutory language and expressly state that if a court executes an order
for an ex parte seizure that the court must (1) “set forth findings of fact and conclusions
of law required for the order,” (2) “provide for the narrowest seizure of property
necessary . . . and direct that the seizure be conducted in a manner that minimizes any
interruption of the business operations of third parties and, to the extent possible, does
not interrupt the legitimate business operations” of the accused, (3) include an
accompanying order to “protect[ ] the seized property from disclosure by prohibiting
access by the applicant or the person against whom the order is directed,” and to
“prohibit[ ] any cop[ying], in whole or in part, of the seized property, to prevent undue
damage to the party against whom the order has issued or others,” and importantly this
accompanying order must stand “until such parties have an opportunity to be heard in
court,” and furthermore must, “provide that if access is granted by the court to the
applicant or the person against whom the order is directed, the access shall be consistent
with” the materials in custody of court and the confidentiality provision, (4) “provide
guidance to the law enforcement officials executing the seizure that clearly delineates
the scope of the authority of the officials, including . . . the hours during which the
seizure may be executed,” and “whether force may be used to access locked areas,” (5) “set
a date for a hearing . . . at the earliest possible time, and not later than 7 days after the
order has issued,” and (6) “require the person obtaining the order to provide the security
determined adequate by the court for the payment of the damages that any person may
be entitled to recover as a result of a wrongful or excessive seizure or wrongful or
excessive attempted seizure.”).
122

123
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substantial risk and even took affirmative steps to prevent, or at
least soften the blow from, erroneous deprivation of property.127
Lawmakers contend that such deprivations are limited,
and perhaps even necessary collateral damage, in order to
prevent far worse dissemination of trade secrets abroad to
foreign competitors.128 A primary argument in this vein is that
existing state laws are unable to provide adequate remedies
“when trade secrets are stolen by a foreign company.”129 Under
the DTSA, not only do all activities affecting interstate
commerce fall within the statute’s purview, but the statute also
covers “all products and services used in foreign commerce.”130
This language about foreign commerce is fundamental to
understanding the DTSA’s core purpose. Congress, urged on by
the Obama Administration, the FBI, and others,131 passed this
law primarily in an attempt “to inform other countries that the
U.S. views trade secrets to be just as important as patents,
copyrights and trademarks.”132 Many scholars and government
agencies view the DTSA as a “significant step” in allowing the
United States to pursue trade secrets claims abroad and opine
that it encourages other countries to pursue misappropriators
within their own borders.133 The law is undoubtedly significant,
but it remains to be seen whether the ex parte seizure provision
will primarily be invoked for claims against foreign actors, or
whether it will become a mere manipulative tool for corporations
to lord over their employees.

127 Toren, supra note 93 (“Congress recognized the potential for abuse of this
provision.”). Indeed, in January 2016, the DTSA underwent two rounds of amendments
after input from the Senate Judiciary Committee, including “language expressing
Congress’ notion of the importance of balancing the interests of all parties when issuing
an ex parte seizure.” Latest Updates on Federal Trade Secrets Legislation, supra note 4.
See Senate Judiciary Report, supra note 18.
128 See discussion supra Section I.C.
129 James Dowd, et al., Federalizing Trade Secret Protection: A Close Look at
the Ex Parte Seizure Provision, CORP. COUNSEL (May 23, 2016), https://www.wilmer
hale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/2016-05-31-Federal
izing-Trade-Secret-Protection-A-Close-Look-at-the-Ex-Parte-Seizure-Provision.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/6ZSX-PLTE].
130 Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). This protection gives the
court the ability to issue an order “to stop a defendant from sending stolen secrets out of
the country.” Id.
131 See generally supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Obama Report,
supra note 59.
132 Stuart Meyer, The Defend Trade Secrets Act Creates a Federal Option for
Addressing Misappropriation, 42 VT. B.J. 20, 20 (2016).
133 Id. at 21.
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Recent Court Orders Signify Over-Broad Pleadings
under the DTSA

Lawmakers and government agencies maintain that the
new law serves national security interests and that the ex parte
seizure provision will primarily be invoked in instances of trade
secret misappropriation affecting foreign commerce.134 Despite
scholars’ prediction of parties pursuing trade secret claims
abroad, the parties involved in the first DTSA suit were all U.S.
citizens.135 “The ink was barely dry”136 on the newly passed law
when a company used the DTSA to assert a cause of action for
misappropriation against two former employees.137 A mere two
weeks later, another entirely domestic138 suit was brought under
the DTSA.139 As the number of domestic corporations suing
domestic ex-employees under the DTSA continues to grow,140
there is a rising concern that the broadly drafted law does not
properly balance the rights of employees and third parties against
the persistently growing weight of trade secrets holders’ rights.141
This legitimate concern goes directly to the idea that the ex parte
seizure provision, although drafted with good intentions,
improperly denies due process as the vast majority of trade
secrets suits involve non-threatening and non-lethal information.
An examination of recently filed cases under the DTSA
demonstrates that the law is being broadly pleaded and is
usually invoked against parties of more meager financial
means.142 In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rote, the plaintiff, Allstate
Insurance Company (Allstate), one of the largest insurance
Dowd, et al., supra note 129.
See Magic Leap Complaint, supra note 29, at 2.
136 Meyer, supra note 132, at 21.
137 Id. (citing Magic Leap Complaint, supra note 29, at 1).
138 This is by no means an argument that domestic suits regarding trade secrets
do not have merit or should not be taken just as seriously as allegations dealing with
foreign entities. This assertion is made to bring to light that the primary reason the
DTSA was enacted with the ex parte seizure provision was to use in extraordinary
circumstances in instances of cyber hacking and national security and thus far the vast
majority requesters of such seizures do not fit this description. See, e.g., Panera, LLC v.
Nettles, No. 4:16-CV-1181-JAR, 2016 WL 4124114 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016).
139 Complaint at 3, Space Data Corp. v. X, No. 5:16-cv-03260-EDL (N.D. Cal.
filed June 13, 2016); see also Meyer, supra note 132, at 21.
140 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
141 Meyer, supra note 132, at 21. Note that the DTSA does require notice of
whistleblower immunity in employment contracts, but the only penalty for failure to
provide such notice is that the employer is prevented from seeking punitive damages or
attorney fees under the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(3) (Supp. 2016).
142 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rote, No. 3:16-CV-01432-HZ, 2016 WL 4191015,
at *6–7 (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2016) (where the court found that “if a preliminary injunction as
to this issue is erroneously granted, [the defendant] will suffer severe financial loss and
ability to sustain her profession. This is enough to demonstrate that the balance of
equities tips in [the defendant]’s favor.”).
134
135
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companies in the United States, alleged that former employee
and pro se defendant Tanya Rote misappropriated trade secrets,
which mostly constituted customer and local property
information that Rote encountered through routine course of
business as an employee.143 Allstate was granted a preliminary
injunction in part against Rote and the court generally justified
its order on the basis of balancing the equities.144 The Allstate
court explained that the purpose of the DTSA is “to maintain the
sanctity of trade secrets,” and that the court must uphold the
new law.145 The court ordered that Rote return any trade secrets
of Allstate’s that she possessed until trial, but did not order her
to cease operations of her competing insurance business
entirely146 as she was able to make compelling arguments
against the validity of Allstate’s claims.147
In Allstate, the court was not protecting a corporation
holding trade secrets that affect U.S. national security from foreign
competitors.148 Instead, a large corporation used the DTSA to
impede an ex-employee’s autonomy and mobility by taking away
her ability to run a local private insurance agency in the small town
where she resides.149 While the order in Allstate was not issued ex
parte,150 it demonstrates that from the outset the DTSA may be
morphing into an advantageous, and perhaps underhanded, tool
for corporations to control any slight hint of competitive activities
from employees,151 both during and after their employment.152
143 Id. at *1–2 (where Allstate alleged its ex-employee misappropriated
“confidential information, including customer names, addresses, and telephone
numbers”).
144 Id. at *7.
145 Id. at *2–3 (“[T]he Court finds that the balance of the equities and the public
interest tips in Allstate’s favor as to the confidential information issue.”).
146 Id. at *7 (“The Court finds that, based on the evidence presented to it thus
far, Allstate will likely suffer only modest harm if [the defendant] is allowed to operate
from her former Allstate sales location, assuming of course that she does not solicit any
Allstate customers using the confidential information she misappropriated.”).
147 Id. at *6–7 (“However, the Court views Allstate’s demand that [the
defendant] cease operating . . . differently . . . . [I]f a preliminary injunction as to this
issue is erroneously granted, [the defendant argues that she will] suffer severe financial
loss and ability to sustain her profession.”).
148 Id. at *1 (the defendant, a U. S. citizen, allegedly misappropriated her exemployer’s local insurance customer lists).
149 See id. (note that, within the preamble of the opinion, the defendant’s listed
address is located in West Linn, Oregon). As of July 1, 2016, the population of West Linn,
Oregon was estimated to be 26,859. QuickFacts selected: West Linn city, Oregon, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/westlinncityoregon/PST0
45216 [https://perma.cc/D875-CBHP].
150 Allstate, 2016 WL 4191015, at *6–7 (where the defendant makes several
contentions that the court determines tips the balance of equities in her favor).
151 Such as starting a similar line of business or even the simple act of moving jobs.
152 See discussion infra Section III.B (examining the effects of over-secrecy on
innovation).
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Allstate illustrates just how problematic an ex parte proceeding
could be with similar parties and a similar set of facts with no
opportunity for the defendant to be heard.
In an action filed shortly after Allstate, the court in
Earthbound Corp. v. MiTek USA, Inc. found that “the Defend
Trade Secrets Act . . . defines trade secrets similarly to but even
more broadly than the UTSA. Under the EEA, [as amended by
the DTSA,] the Court may grant an injunction to prevent actual
or threatened misappropriation of trade secrets.”153 Similar to the
court’s reasoning in Allstate, the court in Earthbound leaned on
the public interest component of the DTSA, expounding that
“[t]heft of trade secrets, and allowing the thieves to retain and
use the confidential information they purloined, undermines
business development and stability; preventing such conduct in
is the public’s best interest.”154 The court certainly made a valid
point that the public is harmed if society allows unscrupulous
individuals to illegally profit off the backs of others. Yet, the
main takeaway from this decision, which granted a temporary
restraining order (TRO), is that the DTSA allows for a broader
interpretation of what constitutes a trade secret than ever
before.155 Thus, the door is open to all sorts of claims,156 and
perhaps, some that are not so “extraordinary” after all.
C.

Ex Parte Seizure Only under “Extraordinary
Circumstances” is Overly Broad

The statutory text’s requirement that the ex parte seizure
provision shall only be used in “extraordinary circumstances”
does not override the vitally important considerations of due
process in the trade secrets context.157 Congress appears to have
been concerned about due process enough to drop the
“extraordinary circumstances” language into the law.158 Despite
that fact, the provision is broadly construed allowing for
loopholes.159 The DTSA’s definition of trade secrets, stemming
from the EEA, covers any form of information “tangible or
intangible . . . stored, compiled, or memorialized physically,
153 Earthbound Corp. v. MiTek USA, Inc., No. C16-1150 RSM, 2016 WL
4418013, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2016) (emphasis added).
154 Id. at *10.
155 Id.
156 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
157 See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(1) (Supp. 2016) for usage of the “extraordinary
circumstances” language.
158 See supra note 127 for discussion regarding amending the DTSA to address
concerns about ex parte seizure.
159 See discussion supra Section II.B.

384

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1

electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing.”160
The word “physically” implies that information housed only
within the mind of an individual could possibly be the subject of
a civil claim for trade secret misappropriation.161 This definition
points to the DTSA’s ability to target wrongful sharing of
information by any means possible, no matter how absurd,
inadvertent, or unlikely.
Our judicial system is expressly designed for inter partes
proceedings and the Constitution and centuries of common law
reflect these values.162 Are inter partes injunction standards
truly effective in preventing irreparable harm in the ex parte
context? Should corporations be able to engage in ex parte
actions over wrongfully obtained or shared customer lists,163 food
ordering systems,164 or other similarly non-hazardous items?
Parties who should request a preliminary injunction inter partes
will be tempted by the ex parte seizure provision because the
“extraordinary circumstances” language gives plaintiffs wide
latitude for two reasons.
First, the DTSA does not clearly identify the type of
circumstances that would need to occur to trigger an ex parte
seizure.165 Indeed, there are several ways to prove to a court that
an ex parte seizure order is necessarily justified. To demonstrate
“extraordinary circumstances” the plaintiff could provide the
court with evidence that the alleged wrongdoer will flee,
disregard, or refuse to abide by a court order after becoming
aware of the action.166 The plaintiff could also attempt to show
“that immediate irreparable injury will occur absent seizure,”
most likely because the information at issue will be exposed and
lose its trade secrets status, and that not granting a seizure
order poses a threat to plaintiff “greater than that [of] the
misappropriator or third parties.”167 The court in Earthbound
cautioned the parties that “[m]otions for temporary restraining
Toren, supra note 93 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)).
Id.
162 See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 52, at 299.
163 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rote, No. 3:16-CV-01432-HZ, 2016 WL 4191015,
at *1 (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2016) (where Allstate primarily sued over local customer lists and
initially sought ex parte relief).
164 See, e.g., Panera, LLC v. Nettles, No. 4:16-CV-1181-JAR, 2016 WL 4124114,
at *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016) (where Panera sued over the possibility of food ordering
systems information being shared and applied for an ex parte TRO).
165 Similar to deciding a standard preliminary injunction, a party bringing a
misappropriation action must also establish a “substantial likelihood of success on the
merits.” See, e.g., GTO Access Sys., LLC v. Ghost Controls, LLC, No. 4:16CV355WS/CAS, 2016 WL 4059706, at *2 (N.D. Fla. June 20, 2016).
166 McDonald & Johnson, supra note 74.
167 Id.
160
161
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orders without notice to and an opportunity to be heard by the
adverse party are disfavored and will rarely be granted,”
pointing to a local procedural rule.168 The court’s hesitation about
the plaintiff’s request is palpable, and rightly so.
Second, the statute attempts to justify the no-notice
seizure order by stating that a hearing on the matter must be
set within seven days.169 Even for a brief hearing, however,
delays in the discovery process are common, if not expected, with
frequent requests by attorneys, and even the courts, for
extended and excluded time.170 While it is optimistic to trust that
hearings would be timely in a vast majority of cases, it is
unfortunately unlikely.171 Not maintaining possession of
intellectual property, even for a short period of time, could cause
irreparable harm to individuals and businesses since, under the
law, the government could seize their property at a critical time,
such as a product release, without providing prior notice.172
Thus, the question of how courts determine what constitutes an
“extraordinary circumstance” becomes critically important.
One must examine early court interpretation of the
extraordinary circumstance language to fully understand its
implications. In GTO Access Sys., LLC v. Ghost Controls, LLC,173
the district court found that the plaintiff did not adequately
plead circumstances extraordinary enough to justify a TRO.174
The court based its decision largely on timing,175 and concluded
that the circumstances must not have been extraordinary because
the plaintiff discovered that its former employees were starting a
competitor company more than two years earlier, and it took a full
168 Earthbound Corp. v. MiTek USA, Inc., No. C16-1150 RSM, 2016 WL
4418013, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2016) (quoting W.D. WASH. LCR 65(b)).
169 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(B)(v) (Supp. 2016) (specifically directing the hearing
be set “at the earliest possible time, and not later than 7 days after the [ex parte] order
has issued”).
170 See Victor Marrero, The Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs, 37 CARDOZO L. REV.
1599, 1602 (2016).
171 See, e.g., Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1078 (N.D. Cal.
2016) (where the court granted an ex parte TRO against a former employee of plaintiff ’ s
business ordering that “this temporary restraining order shall remain in effect through
June 21, 2016,” which was eleven days after the order was issued, even though the DTSA
prescribes that a hearing must occur within seven days); see also Marrero, supra note
170, at 1602–03 (an article where a U. S. District Judge examines “increasing concerns
that problems in the civil justice system, especially those relating to discovery, have
resulted in unacceptable delays and prohibitive expense” (internal quotations omitted)).
172 See McDonald & Johnson, supra note 74.
173 GTO Access Sys., LLC v. Ghost Controls, LLC, No. 4:16CV355-WS/CAS,
2016 WL 4059706, at *3 (N.D. Fla. June 20, 2016) (where the court examined instances
when a TRO should be issued finding that “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
and drastic remedy and should not be granted unless the movant ‘clearly carries the
burden of persuasion’” (citations omitted)).
174 Id. at *1–4.
175 Id. at *4.
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year for the company to perform “forensic analysis” on the former
employees’ computers.176 The primary takeaway from GTO Access
is that harm must be current or imminent to constitute an
extraordinary circumstance and the alleged misappropriation
cannot be old news. While not the most exacting standard, this
interpretation does narrow the scope of extraordinary
circumstances slightly around this unique set of facts.
In other circumstances, however, the DTSA’s ex parte
seizure provision is proving so enticing that parties are already
attempting to use it to gain ex parte access to personal data. The
court in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook, on facts similar to those in
Allstate,177 granted an ex parte TRO under the DTSA in part, to
prohibit a former employee from using company information and
from contacting customers.178 The court granted an ex parte
order specific to the non-participating defendant’s known
business contacts under the facts alleged.179 The court, however,
expressly denied the plaintiff’s specific request for an ex parte
order “directing a forensics expert to obtain mirrors of the former
employees’ personal devices and accounts.”180 While the court
denied the second part of plaintiff’s request on the basis that it
would be “an intrusive excursion into [the ex-employee’s] private
data, much of which is likely unrelated to this case,”181 a different
court’s discretion under similar facts may come out another way
as there is little to no guidance as to what constitutes
extraordinary circumstances within the provision itself.182 This
level of discovery extends beyond the bounds of traditional
disclosures in preliminary matters of a civil suit and resembles
more of a criminal investigation. As such, this is an especially
egregious request of the court given that the non-present party
has had no opportunity to defend herself. This case further
demonstrates the problematic and vague drafting of the DTSA’s
ex parte seizure provision.
While the DTSA sets a time limit between an ex parte
seizure and subsequent inter partes hearing, in reality this limit
Id. at *3.
For a summary of the facts in Allstate, see supra notes 143–47 and
accompanying text.
178 Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
179 Id.
180 Id. at 1080 (emphasis added). This request was for “data in [the exemployee’s] personal e-mail accounts, her personal iPad, iPhone, computers, other mobile
devices, and any other computer storage drives.” Id. at 1078 (emphasis added).
181 Id. at 1079.
182 The court in OOO Brunswick Rail Mgmt. v. Sultanov dealt with this same issue
when denying an application for an ex parte seizure to obtain mirrors of the defendant’s mobile
phone and laptop by stating that it was “unnecessary” to preserve this specific information.
No. 5:17-CV-00017-EJD, 2017 WL 67119, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017).
176
177
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does not result in meaningful notice for would-be defendants. To
address the second point, that no notice is cured by setting a
hearing on the matter within seven days,183 in granting the ex
parte TRO the court in Schein stated “this temporary restraining
order shall remain in effect through June 21, 2016.”184 This date
was already eleven days after the order was issued even though
the DTSA prescribes that a hearing must occur within seven
days.185 Although the delay may seem slight, “[t]he target of a
seizure order could face significant business challenges if its
assets” are frozen or taken into custody with no notice, especially
as the order stays in place until a court’s order is issued following
the preliminary hearing.186 While the DTSA assures targets that
they will have the fundamental “right to a prompt post-seizure
hearing and the right to recover damages, backed by a security
bond,”187 in Schein no bond was required, thus leaving the door
open for future “potential abuses by unscrupulous plaintiffs.”188
Cases filed under the DTSA are more often than not against
individuals, usually former employees, and few complaints have
been filed against foreign nationals, hackers, or by companies that
have a hand in national security in some way or another.189 The ex
parte seizure provision was included to protect a certain kind of
information, information that is valuable to the economic and
national security of the United States, but as applied, courts have
broadly construed the “extraordinary circumstance” language.190
Based on Congress’s intent, the ex parte seizure provision should
rarely be invoked.191 The provision’s inclusion, however, gives large
businesses the legal ability to effectively silence ex-employees and
limit their mobility.192 Sophisticated and wealthy parties will be
able to take various preventative measures by hiring corporate
counsel to cope with the threat of ex parte seizure orders. Parties of
more restricted financial means, on the other hand, will likely be
hung out to dry.

183 OOO Brunswick, 2017 WL 67119, at *3. See discussion accompanying
supra note 169.
184 Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1072, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
185 Id. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
186 Dowd et al., supra note 129.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
190 See discussion infra Part III.
191 See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
192 See discussion supra Section II.C.
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III.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DTSA’S OVERBROAD
EX PARTE SEIZURE PROVISION

A.

The DTSA Needlessly Tramples Due Process of Law

Due process, which includes fair notice of the charges
against a defendant, “the opportunity to be heard,”193 and an
impartial decision-maker,194 is a cornerstone in the U.S. justice
system. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
states that the government shall not “deprive any person
of . . . property, without due process of law.”195 Trade secrets
have often been considered a subset, or even a “stepchild”196 or
“poor cousin,”197 of intellectual property.198 An important
distinction between trade secrets and other forms of intellectual
property, such as copyrighted works or patented inventions, is
that “once a trade secret is released to the public, it loses its legal
protection against being copied, and thus its financial value.”199
Additionally, trade secrets do not undergo vetting like the other
forms of registered intellectual property making ex parte
proceedings error prone.200 Therefore, trade secrets are distinctive
and distinguishable from other forms of intellectual property and
ex parte seizures will be inappropriate in the vast majority of
trade secrets cases brought under the DTSA. Because trade
secrets are property, and the storage drives and Internet clouds
that often house the information are property, a court order for
law enforcement to seize such property without a hearing
needlessly violates due process.201

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 326 (1976).
Goldman, supra note 52, at 299 (“Our system relies on adversarial
proceedings, where advocates make their case before a neutral adjudicator.”).
195 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
196 Johnson, supra note 31.
197 Meyer, supra note 132, at 20.
198 See, e.g., Graves, supra note 72, at 24 (examining “whether or not trade
secrets are property rights”).
199 Dowd et al., supra note 129.
200 See discussion infra Section III.A.1.
201 See discussion infra Part IV. The Supreme Court has held in other
contexts that this type of seizure is impermissible. See supra note 104 for due process
discussion. See Kevin J. Burns, Securing An Ex Parte Seizure Remedy Under DTSA,
LAW360 (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/890149/securing-an-exparte-seizure-remedy-under-dtsa [https://perma.cc/83VQ-SZAU] (“Armed with such an
order, law enforcement can appear at a place of business and seize physical property
containing allegedly misappropriated trade secrets.”).
193
194
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1. Establishing Trade Secrets as Property
There is a longstanding debate as to whether trade
secrets constitute intellectual property.202 The property lens
through which a trade secret is viewed is directly related, and
not ancillary, to whether the ex parte seizure provision
needlessly violates due process. In a trade secrets action, if a
court is persuaded by the “property rights approach,” the
outcome of two cases with analogous facts will likely come out
quite differently than if the court is following “an employercentric, relational approach.”203 Essentially, courts following the
property approach are likely to favor employees, whereas courts
basing their reasoning in the relational approach (i.e., contract
theory) will tend to favor the employer.
The concept of trade secrets as property has evolved
considerably, and not necessarily in ways that have benefited this
contentious area of law.204 An advisory committee comment on
misappropriation in the Restatement (First) of Torts stated that
“[t]he suggestion that one has a right to exclude others from the
use of his trade secret because he has a right of property in the idea
has been frequently advanced and rejected.”205 This assertion
essentially underlines the difficulty courts face when presented
with ex parte trade secrets actions. Author of numerous articles on
trade secrets, Charles Tait Graves explains, “a property conception
calls upon a reviewing court to define the boundaries of the right
with greater specificity, and may lead the court to rule that not all
202 Graves, supra note 72, at 62 (“One reason scholars debate whether trade
secret law reflects property rights is that trade secret law itself does not provide a
definitive answer.”).
203 Id. at 42 (where the author argues that the property-based conception of
trade secrets is more defensible than a contract-based theory, or the “employer-centric
approach”). The employer-centric approach is a “subjective . . . approach to trade secret
law that undermines the policy goal of promoting a wider pool of unrestricted knowledge
and information,” while “scholars who have offered property-based conceptions of trade
secret law all employ some form of the ‘bundle’ approach to property rights or a set of
powers and restrictions imposed based on calculations about their utility for desired
ends.” Id. at 70, 76. The “familiar bundle of rights concepts” dictates that property-based
rights “are variable sets of rights and obligations that differ widely for each item deemed
property, and that these rights are constructed based on a weighing of varying social
interests and ends.” Id. at 69.
204 Michael P. Simpson, Note, The Future of Innovation: Trade Secrets, Property
Rights, and Protectionism—An Age-Old Tale, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1122 (2005) (“By
rooting trade secret law in an intellectual property based rationale, both the common
law and recent Congressional enactments have expanded trade secret law well beyond
its original parameters. This expansion is unfortunate, both from a theoretical and
practical vantage point: aside from drawing false analogies to patent and copyright law,
this new regime is causing society to suffer by unduly constricting the spread of useful
and innovative ideas.”).
205 See Chow, supra note 51, at 347 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS
§ 757 (AM. LAW. INST. 1939)).
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valuable information learned on the job is protectable.”206 Such
instances include circumstances where the items at issue are truly
deemed trade secrets, and a plaintiff thinks she owns it, but in
reality, does not.207 When trade secrets are jointly created or
developed by a succession of individuals, “each contributor may
have a tenable claim to own any resulting trade secrets.”208
Situations where trade secrets were developed in a collaborative
fashion could be particularly problematic if one of the joint creators
requests an ex parte seizure against other collaborators.209 For, how
can a court properly determine the validity of a plaintiff’s claim of
ownership without all joint owners present? Does it even need to
under the DTSA?
For other forms of intellectual property, the court can be
better assured of valid ownership claims if a mark or copyrighted
work has been properly registered or vetted through
administrative agency tribunals.210 As the DTSA’s ex parte
seizure provision stands now, it “does not require the judge to
rigorously review the plaintiff’s ownership claim,”211 and even
more surprisingly, the plaintiff does not even have to prove they
own the trade secret.212 The standard is merely that the plaintiff
must establish that the trade secrets in question were
“misappropriat[ed] by improper means.”213 In this same vein, but
slightly different than the ownership problem, frequently
plaintiffs are hopelessly unaware that they failed to maintain
the level of secrecy required to make their trade secrets legally
protectable.214 When this type of situation arises, “[a] court has
almost no chance of discovering the lost secrecy on its own.”215
Not having to substantiate ownership claims could allow for the
plaintiff bringing the ex parte application to “present a one-sided
story in an expedited, nonadversarial setting to obtain
improvidently granted seizure orders from a federal judge.”216 It
is inherently problematic that these types of “plaintiffs can
Graves, supra note 72, at 45.
Id. at 52. See Goldman, supra note 52, at 306 (“Although the subsequent chain
of title might get murky (IP ownership transfers do not have to be recorded), the initial
registration provides at least some useful information about ownership to the judge.”).
208 See Chow, supra note 51, at 349.
209 Goldman, supra note 52, at 306.
210 See discussion supra Section I.A.2; see also Chow, supra note 51, at 349
(“[T]he UTSA is not based on a property theory of entitlement: The Uniform Act codifies
the basic principles of common law trade secret protection, preserving its essential
distinctions from patent law.”); Goldman, supra note 52, at 306.
211 Goldman, supra, note 52, at 306.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 304.
215 Id.
216 Burns, supra note 201.
206

207
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pursue an ex parte action based on their uninformed, but
erroneous, belief that they still have trade secret protection.”217
To be fair, in general, courts have treated applications for
ex parte orders with caution.218 The necessities for procuring
such an order “are far more onerous than the requirements for
obtaining” an inter partes TRO.219 The glaring reality remains,
however, that our adversarial judicial system “was not built for
ex parte proceedings.”220 Goldman has advanced a promising
theoretical explanation as to why this is so:
In theory, in adversarial proceedings, self-interested advocates will
highlight their strongest arguments and highlight the weaknesses of
their opponent’s arguments; and in theory, this back-and-forth
between advocates helps the truth emerge. Because the advocates are
trashing each other’s arguments, the judge can focus on enforcing the
applicable rules of engagement to ensure that the advocates do not
overreach procedurally. . . . While the petitioner will showcase its
case’s strengths, a self-interested opponent will not be present to point
out the case’s weaknesses. As a result, the judge only hears the
petitioner’s glossiest story. For judges used to picking between the
advocates’ narratives after they have been picked apart by their
opponents, only hearing one side of the story runs contrary to the
judge’s traditional decision-making process.221

Goldman, supra note 52, at 304.
See OOO Brunswick Rail Mgmt. v. Sultanov, No. 5:17-CV-00017-EJD, 2017
WL 67119, at *1–4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017) (where, in the case of two individual
defendant employees, the court granted a TRO under the DTSA, but denied an ex parte
seizure request on the basis that such a request was not available to the plaintiff because
it was “unnecessary” to preserve the information); see also Order, Jones Printing, LLC
v. Adams Lithographing Co., 1:16-cv-442 (E.D. Tenn. filed Nov. 3, 2016) (where the court
denied an ex parte seizure application because the “Plaintiff d[id] not specify why relief
under Rule 65 is inadequate in this case,” and specifically mentioned that traditional
injunctive relief “appears to be the preferred form of injunctive relief . . . to date.”).
219 Poff, supra note 108, at 27; see Graves, supra note 72, at 64–66 (examining
various scholarly arguments regarding the legal classification of trade secrets; for
example, “Professor Richard Epstein views trade secrets as property,” but “Professor
Pamela Samuelson takes the opposite position by arguing . . . that trade secret law
should be seen as a form of unfair competition, not property rights, so that certain types
of trade secret disclosures have a better chance of receiving First Amendment
protection,” and in contrast “Professor Robert Bone argues that contract is the most
convincing theory for protecting rights in trade secrets.”). Graves subscribes to the notion
that “[t]rade secret law is most defensible as a weak property-based right.” Id. at 89. He
admits, however, that “we can imagine a scenario where trade secrets are
simultaneously viewed as property for takings purposes, not the type of property that
precludes First Amendment protection, and property rights rather than relational
obligations in the employment [and thus, contractual] context.” Id. at 65.
220 Goldman, supra note 52, at 299. See Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Patents
Absent Adversaries, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1073, 1073 (2016) (explaining that the evolving
patent system is also moving in a disconcerting direction because now “certain cases
proceed without the benefit of participation from adverse parties” and that “[a]bsent
adversaries, the public interests that are served by robust adversarial participation in
patent disputes go unrepresented”).
221 Goldman, supra note 52, at 299.
217

218
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When it comes to trade secrets, even if the plaintiff can
prove ownership to a judge who is hearing only one side of the
story, there is no existing law that would “confer a monopoly on
the owner.”222 This concept is generally understood because any
individual or corporation could arrive at the same trade secret
independent of others in the field.223 Trade secrets are supposed
to be secrets, after all, thus giving rise to the inference that to
compete in business, employees will have to come up with
creative solutions to problems and sometimes those solutions
may be mirror images of each other. As there are loose
ownership requirements in the DTSA,224 the fact that the other
party has no opportunity to be heard prior to a seizure order’s
execution is alarming because the complaining party may not
even have exclusive rights over the property it seeks to protect.
“In fact, the DTSA may actually put more trade secrets at risk
of misappropriation as a result” of the ex parte provision.225
2. Built-in Safeguards Fail
Supporters of the DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision argue
that the many safeguards that Congress wove into the law will
greatly diminish risk of erroneous deprivation.226 These views
are misguided. While ex parte seizures may arguably make sense
for counterfeit trademark claims, as discussed above, the
“distinctive features about trade secrets make ex parte seizures
involving trade secrets especially error-prone.”227
222 Peter J. Toren, The Defend Trade Secrets Act, 28 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.
J. 3, 10 (2016).
223 Id. (“Thus, the DTSA does not in any way prohibit companies,
manufacturers, or inventors from using their skills, knowledge, and experience to solve
a problem or invent a product they know someone else is working on.”).
224 “The DTSA speaks in terms of the ‘owner’ of a trade secret, but the term
‘owner’ is defined to include not only the legal owner (i.e., the party with legal title to
the trade secret), but also an equitable title holder and a licensee of the trade secret.”
Eric E. Bensen, Defending Trade Secrets Under the Economic Espionage Act, LEXIS
PRAC. ADVISOR J. (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-practiceadvisor/the-journal/b/lpa/archive/2016/09/13/defending-trade-secrets-under-the-econo
mic-espionage-act.aspx [https://perma.cc/V64B-UQ8Z] (footnotes omitted). Note that
this is not a defense to misappropriation through improper means. See id. (“This does
not mean, however, the theoretical ability of others to ascertain the invention through
proper means is a defense to where the defendant has acquired the trade secret through
improper means.” footnote and internal quotations omitted)).
225 Levine, supra note 85, at 327; see Goldman, supra note 52, at 307 (“The
procedural fast lane comes with the potential for significant competitive abuse, where a
competitor can potentially kick its rival out of the industry—at least for a little while—
before the rival gets a chance to make its case in court.”) (footnote omitted).
226 See discussion supra Part I; see also IPO Comments to Senate Judiciary
Committee in Support of S. 1890, the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (Nov. 30, 2015);
IPO Letter Supporting Protection for Trade Secrets in H.R. 3534 (July 29, 2010).
227 Goldman, supra note 52, at 303.
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An ex parte seizure order will only be issued if the
following can be adequately demonstrated to the court from a
clear recitation of facts that:
(1) injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 is
inadequate; (2) the plaintiff will suffer “immediate and irreparable
injury”; (3) the harm to the plaintiff outweighs the harm to both the
defendant and any third parties who may be affected by the order; (4)
the plaintiff is likely to show both misappropriation and that the
defendant is in possession of the trade secret; (5) a particular
description of the subject of the seizure and its location; (6) the
defendant would move, hide or destroy the materials if notice were
provided; and (7) the plaintiff has not “publicized” the requested
seizure.228

If a plaintiff is able to satisfy the above requirements,
there are several caveats to the seizure order.229 Unless the
parties both agree to a later date, the court is required to set a
hearing “no more than seven days after a seizure order issues.”230
The plaintiff must provide the court with “specific instruction for
law enforcement when the seizure can take place and whether
force may be used to access locked areas.”231 The seizure also
must not to be designed to suspend lawful business activities
isolated from the trade secrets at issue.232 A defendant served
with a seizure order can also request ex parte encryption of any
seized assets and the law specifically does not permit copying of
such assets.233 The order is not made public as the court must
“protect the alleged perpetrator,” especially a competitor, “from
publicity about the order and the resulting seizure.”234
The DTSA does provide a remedy for victims of wrongful
seizures. If, after granting an order, a court determines that the
seizure order was sought in bad faith, and therefore improperly
granted, the defendant may be able “to recover damages for lost
profits, cost of materials, loss of good will, and attorney fees as well
as punitive damages.”235 The numerous safeguards that were
legislated to combat the high risk of erroneous deprivation under
the DTSA should have had the constitutional violation alarm bells
ringing for members of Congress during the law’s enactment.
Poff, supra note 108, at 26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2016).
See Kurt A. Kappes & Richard C. McCrea Jr., The Defend Trade Secrets Act of
2016, GREENBERG TRAURIG (May 4, 2016), http://www.gtlaw.com/News-Events/Publications/
Alerts/194604/The-Defend-Trade-Secrets-Act-of-2016 (“The ex parte seizure provision contains
a number of procedural safeguards to deter litigation abuse.”).
230 Dowd et al., supra note 129.
231 See Toren, supra note 93.
232 Dowd et al., supra note 129; see Toren, supra note 93.
233 See Dowd, et al., supra note 129.
234 Id.
235 Id.
228

229
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The first safeguard, that a hearing will occur within
seven days, is an optimistic prospect at best.236 Notwithstanding
the probable delays that defendants would experience, even if
for only a few days, a “seizure could massively disrupt a targeted
business or even temporarily shut it down.”237 If the requested
seizure was for source code238 of a smartphone application239 for
a new start-up company, for example, the “resulting business
interference could kill the targeted business permanently” if
brought at a precarious moment in time.240 A supporter of the
DTSA could argue even in this instance that no irreparable
harm occurred because the company can seek punitive damages
for a wrongful seizure under the statute.241 While this contention
might be appealing, “a disrupted start-up may lose billions of
dollars of market cap potential,”242 and without being a proven
or longstanding entity, courts “will be reluctant to award large
and seemingly speculative compensating damages.”243
Additionally, it is quite possible that “[e]ach quick seizure could
produce a multi-year litigation hangover.”244 That is, if the
parties both have the financial means to keep it going.245
For the same reasons, requiring that the plaintiff post
bond if the seizure order is granted may also not successfully
alleviate irreparable harm experienced by a wrongfully accused
defendant. In fact, the court in Schein did not even require the
See discussion supra Section II.C.
Goldman, supra note 52, at 293–93.
238 Id. at 290 (“It is unclear if the Seizure Provision would extend to all
executable code versions of the software; if it does, then the Seizure Provision would
allow the trade secret owner to take its rival out of the market, at least for a short
while.”); see C.D.S., Inc. v. Bradley Zetler, CDS, LLC, 190 F. Supp. 3d 375, 375–78
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (In this case, the president of a software company for a modeling agency
app “testified that due to the inability to fix or improve its software product, C.D.S. would
suffer harm by inability to retain clients, damage to its reputation, and loss of business.
According to [her] testimony: ‘one of the worst parts of this industry is that your
reputation is everything. The minute our clients start talking, our reputation becomes
tarnished and it’s a domino effect.’”). Note that this case was not filed under the DTSA,
but is an example set forth to demonstrate the type of irreparable harm that might be
suffered by a software company with live code.
239 Better known as an “app.” Anita Campell, What the Heck is an “App”?,
SMALL BUS. TRENDS (Mar. 7, 2011), https://smallbiztrends.com/2011/03/what-is-anapp.html [https://perma.cc/799T-K7KV].
240 Goldman, supra note 52, at 293–94.
241 Id. at 293 (“For example, several Congress members indicated that punitive
damages should eliminate any risk of competitive misuse.” (footnote omitted)).
242 Id. at 294.
243 Id. Additionally, “[t]he odds of a court awarding punitive damages, however,
are extremely low . . . . [W]hile truly egregious seizures may trigger punitive damages,
it is overly optimistic to think that punitive damages will eliminate abusive seizures.”
Id. at 293.
244 Id. at 292.
245 See id. at 294 (predicting that the safeguards will backfire as “it would set
up costly battles over the trade secret owner’s scienter when seeking the seizure”).
236
237
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plaintiff to post bond because it was determined that
enforcement of “the TRO [would] not cause any damage to [the
defendant’s] legitimate business.”246 One wonders whether a
non-specialized court is truly equipped to make this type of
determination in an ex parte setting (i.e., without hearing the
other side’s story, especially if the trade secrets in issue are
highly technical in nature).
The additional requirement that seizures remain nonpublicized does not appear to give any discernable benefit to the
defendant and “necessitates a level of secrecy about court rulings
that is unprecedented.”247 Given that an ex parte seizure in the
trade secrets context is now possible for the first time, orders
executing such seizures may appear confusing to those looking
in from the outside.248 Proponents of the DTSA argue that
innocent parties can now better protect their rights while also
not risking sullying their reputation by bringing a lawsuit that
may not necessarily be looked upon favorably by the public.249
These procedural safeguards, while well-intentioned, do not
adequately protect would-be defendants from erroneous
deprivation of property, and thus do not cure the provision’s
violation of due process. Perhaps there may be a worthy reason
that this tool has not existed in this area of law before.
B.

DTSA’s Effects on Policy and the Human Psyche

Compelling over-secrecy not only impedes innovation and
progress,250 but has potentially drastic negative consequences on
the human condition.251 It is vital to consider the practical
implications of the DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision’s existence
as it may have considerable effects on business relations and the
human psyche. In a recent article, intellectual property scholars
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
Poff, supra note 108, at 27. “Further, a court may protect the defendant from
‘publicity’ relating to the seizure order ‘by or at the behest of the person obtaining the
order.’” Id. at 26.
248 See id. at 26–27.
249 See id. at 27.
250 Charles Tait Graves & James A. Diboise, Do Strict Trade Secret and NonCompetition Laws Obstruct Innovation?, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J. 323, 323–24 (2007).
251 See Christie Nicholson, Keeping Secrets Weighs You Down, Literally, SCI. AM.
(Apr. 29, 2012), https://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode/keeping-secrets-weighsyou-down-lit-12-04-29 [https://perma.cc/4AL8-SFWQ] (“We refer to keeping secrets as if they
are material things. And a new study suggests that when we know a secret, we perceive
ourselves as being physically burdened.”); see also Art Markman, This Is The Secret To
Keeping Secrets, FAST COMPANY (May 31, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3060357/
how-to-be-a-success-at-everything/the-secret-to-keeping-secrets [https://perma.cc/KA
S8-XQCC] (“When you have a piece of information that’s being withheld from other people
for any of those reasons, it takes a certain amount of mental effort to keep it secret.”).
246
247
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Charles Tait Graves and James A. Diboise examined whether
“overbroad trade secret laws operate to restrict innovation and
impede the growth of small, creative businesses—especially
those founded by former employees of larger, established
companies.”252 Graves and Diboise found that:
a less restrictive regime in these areas of law is more likely to foster
the growth of entrepreneurial, creative companies. That conclusion
may seem counter-intuitive or even controversial. After all, much of
the mythology of intellectual property law holds that strong laws
protect inventors and foster innovation. We take the opposite
approach with respect to non-competition agreements, overbroad
trade secret rules, and other practices that make it difficult for
creative employees to quickly and easily change jobs.253

The DTSA’s seizure provision is next in the line of a
string of statutory and common law rules that seek to protect big
companies from individual employees. If the true purpose of the
DTSA is to be realized, to protect the safety of U.S. citizens and
provide economic security, the ex parte seizure provision must
be amended to narrow its focus.
Upon the DTSA’s enactment, multiple intellectual
property law firms issued papers informing clients about
implementing tactics to protect themselves from seizure
orders.254 The release of these recommendations demonstrates
that firms expect an explosion of litigation under the DTSA. The
most problematic implication from these law firm papers is that
this type of “trade secret law may not add much to existing
incentives to invent,”255 and, worse, could discourage collaborative
innovation.256 The effect on innovation is that this type of fear
could “dissuade former employees from using information they
believe to be non-secret.”257 Consider the implication that certain
innovations may never exist because of the ex parte seizure
provision’s potentially chilling effect on professional relationships.258
252 Graves & Diboise, supra note 250, at 323. “We take issue with the concept
that protecting an employer from competition by its former employees should be the
primary aim of state trade secret and employee mobility regimes.” Id. at 328.
253 Id. at 323.
254 See Kappes & McCrea, supra note 229; see also Krotoski & Burkholder,
supra note 12; McDonald & Johnson, supra note 74; Latest Updates on Federal Trade
Secrets Legislation, supra note 4.
255 Graves, supra note 72, at 81.
256 It is an unfortunate reality that “the risk of threats and litigation increases
with the similarity of the new job.” Id. at 88 (making there that this is “a context in which
the individual will suffer personal character attacks”). Id.
257 Id.
258 Additionally, this type of trade secrets legislation also disrupts the
legitimacy and undermines the purpose of other areas of intellectual property, such as
patents. The point of registration for intellectual property is to put others on notice that
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The mere existence of a legal option for corporations to seize a
competitor’s assets may send business relations tumbling down a
rabbit hole with more suspicion floating around than ever before,
especially because in trade secrets suits the majority of “competitors”
are usually individual ex-employees.259 We need to invest more in
innovation,260 and should not be cultivating a breeding ground
for continuous, unnecessary, or even harmful, litigation.
Panera, LLC v. Nettles demonstrates a corporate giant’s
attempt to limit employee mobility with pinpoint accuracy.261
Defendant Michael Nettles, a vice president in the Information
Technology department of popular bakery café chain Panera,
asked permission in writing from Panera’s CEO to waive his
non-compete agreement as he needed a change of pace after his
wife’s recent and unexpected death.262 The CEO refused and
fired Nettles, who then ended up accepting a position at Papa
John’s, a fast food pizza restaurant chain.263 Panera sought a
TRO under the DTSA to “enjoin Papa John’s from employing
Nettles” and asked the court to seize Nettles personal devices,
such as his laptop.264
The court issued the TRO, but it almost appeared to do
so reluctantly and ordered Panera to post a hefty $200,000 bond
for the seizure and for stopping Nettles from working in case the
allegations of misappropriation turned out to be false.265 The
court suggested its hands were tied when it stated that “denying
injunctive relief will undermine the enforcement of statutes
including the Defend Trade Secrets Act.”266 With the court’s
hands tied by the broad statute, and a victory for Panera under
a not-so-convincing set of facts, the outcome of this case is
troubling. For the well-being of society and the economy,
it is their property and “a trade secret-based incentive to invention may detract from the
patent system by keeping inventions out of the public eye.” Id. at 81.
259 Id. at 43 (pointing out that “virtually all trade secret disputes involve former
employees”).
260 Levine, supra note 85, at 335.
261 Panera v. Nettles, No. 4:16-CV-1181-JAR, 2016 WL 4124114, at *1–6 (E.D.
Mo. Aug. 3, 2016).
262 Id. at *1.
263 Id.
264 Id. at *2 (“Panera asks the Court to order Nettles to provide his personal
laptop and any other materials that may have housed Panera information for review and
inspection.”). Fortunately, the TRO hearing was held as an inter partes proceeding. Id.
at *1. Nettles was able to have his opportunity to argue in court that he was forced to
sign the non-compete agreement under duress in 2013 for fear of being terminated while
his wife underwent expensive cancer treatments, more than a year after he had been
initially hired in 2012. Id. at *1–2. He also argued that Papa John’s was not a direct
competitor of Panera, an assertion that is highly unlikely to have been made by Panera
had the proceedings occurred ex parte. Id. at *1.
265 Id. at *5.
266 Id.
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employees should be encouraged to be honest with their
employers. Here, the employee, a top performer, was honest with
his boss about his intentions and even went so far as to ask for
permission in writing before he acted. In return, he was
punished for wishing to move on, immediately fired, prevented
from using his technical skills to work elsewhere, and the DTSA
legally permitted the corporation to inflict such punishment.
Cases such as Panera illustrate that some corporate
plaintiffs are already using the ex parte seizure provision to
unnecessarily squash an ex-employee’s due process rights with
the goal of restricting flexibility in an increasingly mobile and
global workforce.267 In the business world, employee mobility is
finally starting to be recognized for its “crucial benefits,”268
instead of its detriments.269 Rather than creating a culture of
fear that “ultra-ambitious” employees are out to steal anything
they create while on the job, the corporate sector should embrace
the idea that businesses are “better off having the best people
for a short time than average people forever.”270 The importance
of this concept cannot be ignored as it has started to materialize
that “[t]he DTSA has a very long reach and trade secret issues
are likely to arise in a greater number of situations, including
almost every time an employee leaves or joins a new company or
when a company hires a contractor.”271
Trade secrets law should not only operate in favor of
employers, but should better protect the interests of employees
by helping to better define appropriate, yet not inhibiting,
boundaries upon “the knowledge base they acquire and develop

See discussion supra Section III.A.
Graves, supra note 72, at 43–44.
269 Over the last decade, Dr. Sydney Finkelstein, Director of the Tuck Center for
Leadership at Dartmouth College, has been “studying the world’s greatest bosses across 18
industries.” Sydney Finkelstein, Why the Best Leaders Want Their Superstar Employees to
Leave, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-the-best-leaderswant-their-superstar-employees-to-leave-1475460841 [https://perma.cc/HSZ4-AGWJ].
Based upon his research and observations, Dr. Finkelstein concluded that “mastering the
flow of talent,” and not the coveting or punishing of such talent, causes “an organization [to
be] far more resilient, sustainable and successful over the long term.” Id. Furthermore,
and quite intriguingly, he found that “[o]utstanding bosses who let their top talent leave
developed reputations as launchpads; their companies were places to go to supercharge
a career.” Id. (offering advice to business leaders that “[w]hen you stop hoarding your
people and focus on creating a talent flow, you find that more of your top people actually
do wind up staying”). The atmosphere at these so-called launchpads “offered unique
opportunities for excitement, innovation and advancement,” which in turn allowed
employees to produce the most ground-breaking and financially profitable work. Id.
(“The leaders [Dr. Finkelstein] studied built iconic businesses, transformed entire
industries and in a number of instances became billionaires.”).
270 Id.
271 Toren, supra note 222, at 10.
267
268
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during each job.”272 The ex parte seizure provision all but ensures
that non-secret trade information may not be used for fear of
litigation, or scarier, that property will be outright seized with no
notice, which in turn lowers the probability of successful
innovation.273 Our brains perceive secrets as an actual weight, a
burden they have to bear.274 Neurosurgeon Gopal Chopra explains
that “[t]he bigger the secret, or the riskier you perceive it[ ] . . . ,
the more intense the conflict within your brain, resulting in
higher anxiety.”275 Given that the vast majority of trade secrets
cases litigated in the United States are against ex-employees, it
might be fair to intimate that such anxiety is not unwarranted.
Unfortunately, uneasiness among ex-employees may
only become more severe with the implementation of the ex parte
seizure provision under the DTSA. The evidence suggests that
businesses could be more profitable in the long-term, and
likewise save mountains of litigation expenses, if the focus was
on the “non-economic interests of employees” such as personal
growth, overall well-being, and unstoppable ambition.276
IV.

NARROWING THE PURVIEW OF THE EX PARTE SEIZURE
PROVISION

The ex parte seizure provision of the DTSA should be
narrowed in its focus to prevent needless violation of citizens’
fundamental right to due process. Courts will continue to apply
differing reasoning and approaches as to what constitutes an
“extraordinary circumstance” unless the statute explicitly
narrows the circumstances when the court would be justified in
seizing a defendant’s property interests with no notice as to the

272 Graves, supra note 72, at 43. “By introducing the DTSA, Congress is
effectively treating U.S. industry the same way that the Court treated DuPont: as the
victim of a tort, a sneaky ‘school boy’s trick’ worthy of condemnation, rather than a party
with responsibility for protecting its property but nonetheless allowing the ‘school boy’s
trick’ to cause it such harm.” Levine, supra note 85, at 335.
273 Graves, supra note 72, at 83. “Such interminable injunctions could impede
fair competition, employee mobility and innovation.” Poff, supra note 108, at 27
(explaining that the provision “could be used for anti-competitive purposes, in that
injunctions granted under a federal trade secret law would not be limited to the lead
time advantage of the party accused of misappropriation”).
274 See Eric Jaffe, The Science Behind Secrets, ASS’N FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL
SCIENCE, OBSERVER VOL. 19 NO. 7 (July 2006) http://www.psychologicalscience.org/
index.php/publications/observer/2006/july-06/the-science-behind-secrets.html [https://
perma.cc/29XT-HD4D].
275 Gina Roberts-Grey, Keeping Secrets Can Be Hazardous To Your Health,
FORBES (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2013/10/24/keepingsecrets-can-be-hazardous-to-your-health/#2bc8f0737efc [https://perma.cc/LLX5-4BAM].
276 Graves, supra note 72, at 82.
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charges against them.277 There are solutions and alternative
approaches that aim to address concerns of a wide variety of
parties and accommodate differing societal perspectives by
narrowing the instances in which use of the ex parte seizure
provision is proper.
A.

Equalizing the Notice Predicament by Limiting
Extraordinary Circumstances

Adding even more safeguards to the already listed litany
of protections in the statute is unlikely to remedy the
fundamental notice issue. The way the provision is currently
drafted, the government has not demonstrated that it has a
compelling enough interest in the general trade secrets context
to override the fundamental considerations of due process. The
statute is over-inclusive so as to open the possibility of ex parte
seizures against inappropriate parties unnecessarily exposing
them to constitutionally questionable practices. The lack of
notice to the opposing party before property is seized is the
primary reason the provision is unconstitutional, and thus, is
the principal ill that must be cured in order to equitably protect
the rights of all parties when litigating under the DTSA.
On its face and as applied, the wide purview of the ex
parte seizure provision in the DTSA does not comport with our
most basic understanding of due process. More specifically, the
current broadness of the provision inadequately addresses the
legitimate concerns advanced by the executive and legislative
branches of the government. As the statute currently stands,
any individual or company that can demonstrate irreparable
harm may convince a court it is entitled to an ex parte seizure
order.278 Judges quite simply do not always know whether they
are dealing with a validly protectable trade secret in an ex parte
action.279 Narrowing the “extraordinary circumstances”
language would help guide courts as to when overriding due
process is necessarily justified.
The legislative history indicates that Congress was
concerned with matters of national security during the DTSA’s
drafting and enactment.280 Thus, extraordinary circumstances
should be limited to only those matters that pose substantial and
imminent risks to the safety and defense of U.S. citizens.
277 Graves’ theory of trade secrets as a “weak” property interest has been
adopted for the purposes of this note. See, e.g., id. at 89.
278 See Goldman, supra note 52, at 288, 290.
279 See discussion supra Section II.A.1.
280 See discussion supra Section I.C.
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Congress needs to close the loopholes associated with the
extraordinary circumstance language or the provision will be
ineffective in achieving its primary purpose of not allowing
protected information to leave the country.281 Narrowing the
provision to be invoked only when imminent national security
threats can be demonstrated to a court would still allow for the
law to operate when it was truly needed for security purposes.
Limiting the circumstances in this manner would put the
applicable industries, and correspondingly, the employees
within, on constructive notice that their work falls under the
statute’s purview. This notice would afford such employers and
employees at least some fairness in terms of due process. After
all, the vast majority of suits brought under the DTSA thus far
have been against domestic ex-employees.282
If narrowed in this manner, the provision would be
applied by assessing short-term and long-term safety risks of
losing the type of trade secrets at issue. If there is no cognizable
physical safety risk for the materials at stake—such as customer
lists for an insurance company,283 or an employee leaving for
another job in the food industry284—an ex parte application is
simply inappropriate.
B.

Narrowing the Provision Encourages Competent
Protection Practices

Companies have a responsibility to keep their legally
protectable competitive information a secret.285 With the DTSA’s ex
parte seizure provision in their back pocket, however, they will
likely choose to sue under the DTSA “when faced with the choice of
improving their reasonable efforts to maintain their secrets or
suing under the DTSA.”286 As it stands, determining that an
extraordinary circumstance exists “will consume extraordinary
amounts of labor, time and skill, or the narrowest seizure will not

See discussion supra Section I.B.
See discussion supra Sections II.B, III.B.
283 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rote, No. 3:16-CV-01432-HZ, 2016 WL 4191015, at *1–3
(D. Or. Aug. 7, 2016) (where an insurance company sued a former employee under the
DTSA for allegedly using former customer lists).
284 Panera, LLC v. Nettles, No. 4:16-CV-1181-JAR, 2016 WL 4124114, at *1–4
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016) (where a corporation that operates “bakery-cafes” sued a former
employee under the DTSA for leaving to work for a competitor).
285 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 85, at 338 (where the author argues that “it is
time for Congress to focus more on the question of what responsibility U.S. industry has
to engage in self-help”).
286 Id. at 334.
281

282
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be very narrow.”287 For these reasons, the ex parte seizure provision
should be narrowed to only include circumstances that affect trade
secret owners who are involved in the business of military
technology or related technological innovations.
This limiting effect would force these corporations to
devote resources to innovating more comprehensive protection
practices and employee education regarding trade secrets, and
may potentially also have downstream effects, leading to
corporations across many industries following suit. Narrowing
the applicable circumstances of the provision would also require
that mammoth corporations foot the bill of safeguarding trade
secrets in the private sector. The way the provision is currently
drafted allows for clogging up the judiciary with needless ex
parte proceedings while simultaneously shifting the costs of
protection to the taxpayer.288 Indeed, creating and enforcing
better protection practices was the underlying purpose of the
DTSA in the first place. The Obama Administration, the FBI,
and Congress appeared to be most concerned about national
security threats and all wanted to let the world know that the
United States takes its trade secrets law seriously.289
Narrowing the statute’s focus in this manner would still
allow for ex parte proceedings to occur when failure to stop a
misappropriator would be harmful to national security. Even if
the provision were to be narrowed as such, there will likely still
be instances where wrongful seizures occur.290 The adversarial
nature of the U.S. justice system is not designed for such
proceedings, and therefore errors are to be expected.291 The risk
of erroneous deprivation, however, over such trivial items as
customer lists (trivial as compared to Kevlar vests that protect
soldiers in combat, that is) should not be up for debate. A trade
secrets owner has many tools to hold misappropriators
accountable during litigation, including preliminary injunctions
and even ex parte TROs.292
Laws regulating civil conduct in the corporate context,
such as the DTSA, are necessary and important, but these laws
serve their purpose only when they are applied as intended.
287

omitted).

Goldman, supra note 52, at 291 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks

288 “Congress allocated $1.11 trillion in discretionary spending in fiscal year 2015,”
and $72.89 billion was allocated directly to the federal government. Federal Spending: Where
Does the Money Go, NAT’L PRIORITIES PROJECT, https://www.nationalpriorities.org/budgetbasics/federal-budget-101/spending [https://perma.cc/3L2A-E3DH].
289 See discussion supra Section I.B.
290 See discussion supra Section II.A.
291 See discussion supra Section II.A.
292 Goldman, supra note 52, at 286–87.
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Given the array of legitimate issues that companies already face
today, the legislature should not have provided corporations
with a tempting and constitutionally questionable tool that has
the potential to clog up the federal judiciary with claims that are
solely meant to stomp out the competition. The ex parte seizure
provision has the significant potential to effectively become a
new, but decidedly more crippling, non-compete enforcement
mechanism, as observed in Allstate and Panera.293 We should be
wary of such an occurrence because if large corporations find this
provision particularly useful it may indicate the emergence of
more ex parte proceedings becoming drafted into legislation
through lobbying efforts on Congress.
CONCLUSION
Is the acquisition or disclosure of any confidential or
proprietary business information by improper means
reprehensible and potentially harmful conduct? Of course.
Should victims of trade secrets misappropriation be able to
pursue claims of such alleged activities vigorously under U.S.
law? Absolutely. Should “every-day” standard course of business
and non-lethal information be so legally protectable as to
override such fundamental rights as a U.S. citizen’s right to due
process? The illustrative examples and cases discussed above
effectively demonstrate that the answer to this last question is
a resounding no.
Although the DTSA was enacted to address legitimate
national security concerns, the law is not narrowly construed to
achieve its goals. The ex parte seizure provision does not comport
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
additionally may be over-used allowing for large institutions to
silence less financially secure competitors. The primary purpose
of including the provision was to ensure that evidence of
misappropriation could not be destroyed or lifted from the
country. In order to prevent such occurrences, the legislature
should guide the courts by including a specific set of
circumstances under which the seizure provision can be properly
applied, rather than the overbroad and ill-defined term
“extraordinary circumstances.” The potential, and already
293 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rote, No. 3:16-CV-01432-HZ, 2016 WL 4191015,
at *1–3 (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2016); Panera, LLC v. Nettles, No. 4:16-CV-1181-JAR, 2016 WL
4124114, at *1–4 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016); see also Levine, supra note 85, at 327–28
(where Levine argues that the DTSA “solves a problem that has not been proven to exist,
while creating new or exacerbating existing problems.”). Accord Goldman, supra note 52,
at 286–87.
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emerging, negative effects of such a provision on public policy,
corporate relations, and human behavior merit serious
discussion by the legislature when revisiting the DTSA.
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